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 535 
“QUESTIONS INVOLVING NATIONAL PEACE 
AND HARMONY”  
OR “INJURED PLAINTIFF LITIGATION”?  
THE ORIGINAL MEANING OF “CASES” IN 
ARTICLE III OF THE CONSTITUTION 
Haoshan Ren, Margaret Wood, Clark D. Cunningham, 
Noor Abbady, Ute Römer, Heather Kuhn, & Jesse 
Egbert* 
INTRODUCTION  
If a federal official is deliberately violating the Constitution, is it 
possible no federal court has the power to halt that conduct? Federal 
judges have been answering “yes” for more than a century—
dismissing certain kinds of lawsuits alleging unconstitutional conduct 
by ruling the lawsuits were not “cases” as meant in the phrase “[t]he 
Judicial Power shall extend to all Cases” in Article III, Section Two, 
of the Constitution.1 
                                                                                                             
*  Haoshan Ren is a Ph.D. student in applied linguistics at Georgia State University. Margaret Wood is a 
Ph.D. student in applied linguistics at Northern Arizona University. Clark D. Cunningham is a professor 
at the Georgia State University College of Law. Noor Abbady is a professor of English as a Second 
Language at the Savannah College of Art & Design and an instructor in the Department of World 
Languages and Cultures at Georgia State University. Ute Römer is a professor in the Georgia State 
University Department of Applied Linguistics and English as a Second Language. Heather Kuhn, J.D. 
2019, is a Data Privacy and Security Consultant at Cox Communications. Jesse Egbert is a linguistics 
professor at Northern Arizona University. The authors thank for their comments linguists Viviana Cortes, 
Scott Crossley, Edward Finegan, Tammy Gales, Benjamin Lee, and Hans-Jörg Schmid and law professors 
Michael C. Dorf, James E. Pfander, Robert J. Pushaw. Jr., and Susan Smelcer. The research reported in 
this article was presented at a Workshop on Law & Linguistics, hosted by Georgia State University on 
Friday, October 18, 2019. The PowerPoint and video from this presentation, including comments by Susan 
Smelcer, are available at: http://www.clarkcunningham.org/Workshop-Law-Linguistics.html. 
 1.  The full text of Section Two is:  
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this 
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, 
under their Authority;—to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and 
Consuls;—to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;—to Controversies to 
which the United States shall be a Party;—to Controversies between two or more 
States;—between a State and Citizens of another State;—between Citizens of different 
States;—between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different 
States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens[,] or 
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For example, in July 2019, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit dismissed a lawsuit that the State of Maryland and the District 
of Columbia brought against President Donald Trump claiming he is 
deliberately violating the Constitution’s prohibition against receiving 
emoluments from foreign states.2 The lawsuit alleged that foreign 
governments pay substantial sums for using the Trump International 
Hotel in Washington D.C. and that President Trump is sole owner of 
the Trump Organization, which in turn owns that hotel.3 The court 
said: “[T]he District and Maryland’s interest in constitutional 
governance is no more than a generalized grievance, insufficient to 
amount to a case or controversy within the meaning of Article III.”4 
In 1911, the United States Supreme Court declared: “[T]he exercise 
of the judicial power is limited to ‘cases’ and ‘controversies.’ . . . By 
cases and controversies are intended the claims of litigants . . . . The 
term implies the existence of present or possible adverse parties, whose 
contentions are submitted to the court for adjudication.”5 The Supreme 
Court subsequently further specified the meaning of “case” within the 
meaning of Article III to include the following “essential core”: a 
plaintiff who has suffered a concrete and particularized injury that is 
likely to be redressed by a judicial decision.6 Thus, at least in the civil 
setting, the Court has restricted the meaning of “cases” to adversary 
                                                                                                             
Subjects. 
In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those 
in which a State shall be Party, the  supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In 
all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate 
Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such 
Regulations as the Congress shall make.  
The trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury; and such 
Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been committed; but 
when not committed within any State, the Trial shall be at such Place or Places as the 
Congress may by Law have directed. 
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 2. In re Trump, 928 F.3d 360, 379–80 (4th Cir. 2019), reh’g en banc granted, 780 F. App’x 36 (4th 
Cir. 2019) (mem.). At the time of writing, oral argument in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit was scheduled for December 12, 2019. Id. 
 3. Id. at 362–63. 
 4. Id. at 379. 
 5. Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 356–57 (1911). 
 6. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016) (“Injury in fact is a constitutional 
requirement.”); Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). 
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litigation initiated by a plaintiff with a personal and concrete injury—
in brief, “injured plaintiff litigation.”7 
The claims of Maryland and the District of Columbia against 
President Trump were dismissed by the Fourth Circuit without 
consideration of the merits because, in the court’s view, the plaintiffs 
had failed to show “concrete and particularized” injury that was 
different than the alleged harm suffered by all citizens if the President 
is corrupted by receipt of foreign payments.8 Failure to meet the 
Supreme Court’s definition of “case” is described as a “lack of 
standing.”9 Responding to the argument that if the District of Columbia 
and Maryland “could not obtain judicial review of [the President’s] 
action, ‘then as a practical matter no one can[,]’” the Fourth Circuit 
cited the answer provided in a 1974 Supreme Court decision: “[The] 
assumption that if [the plaintiffs] have no standing to sue, no one 
would have standing, is not a reason to find standing.”10 
The empirical research reported in this article suggests that this 
“injured plaintiff litigation” interpretation of the meaning of “cases” 
may be more narrow—perhaps indeed entirely different—than how 
the word in its Article III context would have been used and 
understood by those who drafted and ratified the Constitution. 
For the first two months of a constitutional convention that lasted 
less than three-and-a-half months, various versions of what would 
eventually become Section Two of Article III consistently provided 
that federal courts should have the power to “hear and 
determine . . . questions which may involve the national peace and 
harmony.”11 On July 18, 1787, the Convention unanimously adopted 
the following resolution proposed by James Madison: “[T]he 
                                                                                                             
 7. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1548. 
 8. In re Trump, 928 F.3d at 378–79. The court also rejected claims that plaintiffs were injured based 
on their ownership interests in convention centers that competed with the Trump Hotel, on their raising 
the claims of their residents competing with the Trump Hotel, and on their interest in not being pressured 
to grant favorable treatment to businesses owned by the President. Id. at 375–79. 
 9. Id. at 375–80. 
 10. Id. at 375 (quoting Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, 
Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 489 (1982)). 
 11. See infra notes 120–145 and accompanying text. 
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jurisdiction of the national Judiciary shall extend to cases arising under 
laws passed by the general Legislature, and to such other questions as 
involve the National peace and harmony.”12 
The authors of this article, comprised of a research team of lawyers 
and linguists, used a variety of computer-aided methods for examining 
very large data sets of Founding Era texts to explore linguistic 
implications suggested to them by Madison’s July 18 resolution. This 
research indicated that those who drafted and ratified the Constitution: 
 
(1) Would have understood “cases arising under 
laws” to be a type or example of “questions as 
involve the National peace and harmony”; 
(2) Would have understood “such other questions” 
to be a more general category of jurisdiction than 
“cases arising under laws”; and 
(3) Would not have understood “cases” as having a 
stable, inherent meaning such as “injured 
plaintiff litigation”—instead “cases” in each 
context of use in Article III would have been read 
as having a different meaning, constructed 
through its combination with accompanying 
words.13 
I.   Legal Context and Relevance of Linguistic Analysis 
As famously stated by U.S. Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia 
in District of Columbia v. Heller, in interpreting the Constitution’s 
text, courts “are guided by the principle that ‘[t]he Constitution was 
                                                                                                             
 12. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 39 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) 
[hereinafter RECORDS II] (emphasis added). As to Madison’s authorship of this resolution, see infra notes 
57–64 and accompanying text. 
 13. The linguistic description of this third finding is that “cases” was being used as part of a 
“shell-noun phrase” and thus its meaning was vague and abstract requiring accompanying words to 
provide a “shell content”; the combination of shell noun and shell content creates a complete concept but 
one that is entirely contingent on the particular context of use. See infra notes 82–105 and accompanying 
text. 
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written to be understood by the voters; its words and phrases were used 
in their normal and ordinary as distinguished from technical 
meaning.’”14 As Justice Scalia explained in an equally famous speech, 
the focus of constitutional interpretation should not be “original intent” 
but rather “original meaning”: “What was the most plausible meaning 
of the words of the Constitution to the society that adopted it—
regardless of what the Framers might secretly have intended?”15 
Justice Scalia quoted in support of this position, a letter written by 
James Madison, who has been described as the “master-builder of the 
[C]onstitution”:16  
[W]hatever respect may be thought due to the intention of 
the Convention, which prepared [and] proposed the 
Constitution, as presumptive evidence of the general 
understanding at the time of the language used, it must be 
kept in mind that the only authoritative intentions were those 
of the people of the States, as expressed thro[ugh] the 
Conventions which ratified the Constitution.17 
In looking for “presumptive evidence of the general understanding 
at the time of the language used,” courts have generally relied on 
dictionary definitions and selected quotations from texts dating from 
the period of ratification.18 This article presents a different approach 
by applying the tools of linguistic analysis to “big data” about how 
written language was used at the time of ratification. 
                                                                                                             
 14. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 576 (2008) (quoting United States v. Sprague, 282 
U.S. 716, 731 (1931)). 
 15. Antonin Scalia, Original Meaning, in SCALIA SPEAKS 180, 183 (Christopher J. Scalia & Edward 
Whelan eds., 2017). 
 16. MAX FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 196 (1913). 
 17. Letter from James Madison to Martin L. Hurlbut (May 1, 1830), in The Papers of James Madison, 
FOUNDERS ONLINE, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/99-02-02-2034 
[https://perma.cc/C24L-YJWP]. 
 18. Id.; see, e.g., District of Columbia v. Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d 875, 889–95 (D. Md. 2018), rev’d 
sub nom. In re Trump, 928 F.3d 360 (4th Cir. 2019), and reh’g en banc granted, 780 F. App’x 36 (4th 
Cir. 2019) (discerning “original public meaning” of emolument from dictionaries and sixteen sentences 
from a handful of 18th century texts). 
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The science of linguistics has made dramatic progress in the past 
thirty years due to developments in computer technology, making it 
possible to acquire, store, and process large amounts of digitized data 
representing actual language use.19 Such a data set, when used for 
linguistic analysis, is called a corpus (plural: corpora).20 When 
properly executed, corpus-based linguistic research meets the 
scientific standards of generalizability, reliability, and validity.21 
For empirical research into original meaning of the Constitution, the 
standard of generalizability is met by use of a corpus sufficiently large 
and varied that it represents—in the words of James Madison—the 
“language used . . . [by] the people of the States” when the state 
conventions ratified the Constitution.22 The authors have used the 
Corpus of Founding Era American English (COFEA).23 COFEA 
contains in digital form over 126,000 texts created between 1760 and 
1799, totaling more than 136,800,000 words.24 The texts in COFEA 
come from six sources: the National Archive Founders Online, 
HeinOnline, Evans Early American Imprints from the Text Creation 
Partnership, Elliot–The Debates in the State Conventions on the 
Adoption of the Federal Constitution, Farrand–Records of the Federal 
Constitutional Convention of 1787, and the U.S. Statutes at Large from 
the first five Congresses.25 The sample of Evans Early American 
Imprints included in COFEA contains over 3,000 books, pamphlets, 
                                                                                                             
 19. See generally Lawrence M. Solan & Tammy Gales, Corpus Linguistics as a Tool in Legal 
Interpretation, 2017 BYU L. REV. 1311 (2018). 
 20. Id. at 1337.  
 21. Clark D. Cunningham & Jesse Egbert, Using Empirical Data to Investigate the Original Meaning 
of “Emolument” in the Constitution, supra 36 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 465, 474–75 (2020).  
 22. Letter from James Madison to Martin L. Hurlbut, supra note 17. 
 23. Corpus of Founding Era American English (COFEA), BYU L. CORPUS LINGUISTICS, 
https://lawcorpus.byu.edu [hereinafter COFEA]. COFEA was created by the J. Reuben Law School at 
Brigham Young University. See Stephanie Francis Ward, New Web Platform Helps Users Research 
Meanings of Words Used in Constitution, Supreme Court Opinions, A.B.A. J. (Sept. 17, 2018, 8:00 AM), 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/new_web_platform_helps_users_research_meanings_of_words
_used_in_constitutio [https://perma.cc/HD32-X3MH]. Both the data in COFEA and basic online search 
tools are freely available at: https://lawncl.byu.edu/. Access to COFEA requires registration using a 
Google or Gmail account to guard against hacking. 
 24. See Corpus of Founding Era American English (COFEA), BYU L.: L. & CORPUS LINGUISTICS, 
https://lcl.byu.edu/projects/cofea/ [https://perma.cc/WB8L-TZNJ]. 
 25. Id. 
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and other written materials published in America between 1760 and 
1799.26 Founders Online is a free online resource maintained by the 
National Archives, which provides digital copies of over 90,000 
records found in the papers of six major figures of the founding era: 
George Washington, Benjamin Franklin, John Adams, Thomas 
Jefferson, Alexander Hamilton, and James Madison.27 Founders 
Online contains official documents, diaries, and personal letters 
written by and to these six persons. HeinOnline contains over 300 legal 
materials published during the founding era; primarily federal and state 
statutes, executive department reports, and legal treatises.28 
The reliability standard requires that a research method produce 
consistent results, allowing a different researcher applying the same 
method to duplicate the outcome. The results reported in this article 
can be replicated by anyone who applies the computerized search 
methods herein described to the identified databases. 
Validity refers to how well the results from a method reflect 
real-world patterns. Validity was built into the research reported here 
by beginning with observations of systemic features of real language 
use in the Founding Era, discovering patterns from the ground up (with 
no preconceptions), and subjecting hypotheses to empirical testing 
using the corpus data. 
The origins of this article are in a research seminar paper written by 
Heather Kuhn for a course taught by Clark Cunningham at the Georgia 
State University College of Law in Atlanta, Georgia. Noor Abbady, 
                                                                                                             
 26. Id.; see also Evans Early American Imprints (Evans) TCP, TEXT CREATION PARTNERSHIP, 
https://www.textcreationpartnership.org/tcp-texts/evans-tcp-evans-early-american-imprints/ 
[https://perma.cc/ZE92-BK4N] (last visited Nov. 5, 2019) (explaining that the Text Creation Partnership, 
NewsBank/Readex Company, and the American Antiquarian Society created accurately keyed and fully 
searchable text editions from among the 40,000 titles available in the Evans Early American Imprints 
Collection of the American Antiquarian Society). 
 27. About Founders Online, FOUNDERS ONLINE, https://founders.archives.gov/about 
[https://perma.cc/39W5-FRVZ] (last visited Nov. 5, 2019). The Founders Online component of COFEA 
contains 27,639,683 words, distributed as follows: Washington Papers 12,044,694; Adams Papers 
7,274,489; Hamilton Papers 3,895,699; Franklin Papers 2,578,518; Jefferson Papers 1,726,603; and 
Madison Papers 119,680. Corpus of Founding Era American English (COFEA), supra note 24. About 
70% of the words in the Founders Online component of COFEA come from either the Washington Papers 
(44%) or the Adams Papers (26%). Id. 
 28. Corpus of Founding Era American English (COFEA), supra note 24. 
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then completing an M.A. in Applied Linguistics at Georgia State,29 
was a research and teaching assistant to Cunningham and assisted 
Kuhn in her linguistic research.  
As an expert in data privacy and security, Kuhn was particularly 
interested in the implications of the Supreme Court’s narrow 
interpretation of “cases” for litigation brought by victims of data theft 
and hacking (“data breaches”). Currently, federal courts of appeal 
disagree as to what type of injury relating to a data breach must be 
alleged to state a “case” within the Supreme Court’s interpretation of 
Article III.30 
Data breach cases bring the Supreme Court’s position into sharp 
relief—based on its interpretation of “cases”—that “a plaintiff [does 
not] automatically satisf[y] the injury-in-fact requirement whenever a 
statute grants a person a right and purports to authorize that person to 
sue to vindicate that right.”31 Thus, in Spokeo Inc. v. Robins, the Court 
considered a lawsuit under the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act 
(FCRA), which provided that a consumer could sue for either actual 
damages or statutory damages of $100–$1,000 per violation plus costs 
                                                                                                             
 29. One of the research and teaching foci of the GSU Department of Applied Linguistics and ESL 
(http://alsl.gsu.edu) is Corpus Linguistics. Id. Four of the graduate faculty members in the department 
(Viviana Cortes, Scott Crossley, Eric Friginal, and Ute Römer) specialize in this area. 
 30. Compare In re Horizon Healthcare Servs. Inc. Data Breach Litig., 846 F.3d 625 (3d Cir. 2017) 
(holding that Article III standing is established from the unauthorized dissemination of private information 
as a de facto injury based on Congress passing the Fairness in Credit Reporting Act establishing that it 
was an injury in and of itself), and Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 663 F. App’x 384 (6th Cir. 2016) 
(holding that the complaint satisfies Article III standing because the alleged theft of personal data placed 
them at a continuing risk of fraud and identity theft), with Bassett v. ABM Parking Servs., 883 F.3d 776 
(9th Cir. 2018) (holding that Congress did not create a substantive right based on a statutory violation of 
the Fairness in Credit Reporting Act and Article III standing was not established), Hutton v. Nat’l Bd. of 
Exam’rs in Optometry, Inc., 892 F.3d 613 (4th Cir. 2018) (holding that Article III standing existed for 
plaintiffs alleging personal information was stolen in a data breach by showing injury in the form of out-
of-pocket costs due to the data breach and the time lost while waiting for a response from the defendant 
over the fallout of the data breach), Whalen v. Michaels Stores, Inc., 689 F. App’x 89 (2d Cir. 2017) 
(holding that the possible future threat of harm after credit card information was exposed following a data 
breach at a retail store did not reach the level of a cognizable injury), and Kerin v. Titeflex Corp., 770 
F.3d 978 (1st Cir. 2014) (holding that the consumer’s injury was too speculative to establish standing 
under Article III and dismissed the case). 
 31. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016); see Heather Elliott, Congress’s Inability to 
Solve Standing Problems, 91 B.U. L. REV. 159, 164–65 (2011); Evan Tsen Lee & Josephine Mason Ellis, 
The Standing Doctrine’s Dirty Little Secret, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 169, 226 (2012); Michael E. Solimine, 
Congress, Separation of Powers, and Standing, 59 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1023, 1028 (2009). 
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and attorney fees.32 Thus, in an apparent effort to encourage consumers 
to enforce the FCRA, Congress specifically authorized a consumer to 
recover substantial statutory damages even if the consumer could not 
recover “actual damages.”33 The Court insisted that its interpretation 
of “cases” in Article III trumped the clear intent of Congress, holding 
that a lawsuit alleging that a “web search engine” company had 
disseminated incorrect information about him should still be 
dismissed, unless the plaintiff could further allege the company’s 
action caused him a “concrete” injury.34 
Kuhn’s research raised questions in her mind as to whether the 
doctrine of standing is actually a relatively recent addition to 
constitutional law, rather than being rooted in the original meaning of 
Article III. She noted that many legal scholars argue that standing 
doctrine is a modern invention.35 
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Supreme Court appeared to 
adopt a more generous notion of what constituted a case when 
public-interested citizens challenged governmental action (or 
inaction).36 Thus, in both Sierra Club v. Morton37 and United States v. 
Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures,38 groups of 
citizens challenging government actions as negatively impacting the 
environment were found to have standing by alleging collective harms, 
such as a likelihood to suffer a future injury. 
However, the approach of considering lawsuits alleging collective 
standing to meet the definition of “case” sharply changed with Lujan 
v. Defenders of Wildlife in 1992. In Lujan, the U.S. Secretary of the 
                                                                                                             
 32. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1545. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 1548. 
 35. See, e.g., James E. Pfander, Scalia’s Legacy: Originalism and Change in the Law of Standing, 6 
BRIT. J. AM. LEGAL STUD. 85 (2017); see also Cass Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan: Of Citizen 
Standing, “Injuries,” and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163 (1992); Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of 
Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1371 (1988); Ann Woolhandler & Caleb 
Nelson, Does History Defeat Standing Doctrine?, 102 MICH. L. REV. 689 (2004). 
 36. E.g., United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 
669 (1973); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972). 
 37. Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 741. 
 38. SCRAP, 412 U.S. at 690. 
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Interior had distributed new interpretations of a provision of the 
Endangered Species Act of 1973.39 As a result, consultations on 
development were only required within the U.S. or on the high seas.40 
The Defenders of Wildlife sought to obtain an injunction against this 
interpretation claiming that a more limited consultation would 
“increase the rate of extinction of endangered and threatened 
species.”41 Like the situation in Spokeo, which cited Lujan, the Court 
was unwilling to honor congressional intent to allow enforcement 
lawsuits. Even though Congress had enacted a “citizen suit” provision 
providing that “any person may commence a civil suit on his own 
behalf to enjoin any person, including the United States . . . who is 
alleged to be in violation of [the Endangered Species Act],” the Court 
held: 
[A] plaintiff raising only a generally available grievance 
about government—claiming only harm to his and every 
citizen’s interest in proper application of the Constitution 
and laws, and seeking relief that no more directly and 
tangibly benefits him than it does the public at large—does 
not state an Article III case or controversy.42 
Questioning whether cases like Lujan and Spokeo were in fact 
well-grounded in the original meaning of the Constitution, Kuhn, 
assisted by Abbady, embarked on a study of data in COFEA to 
investigate whether the word “case” was indeed closely associated 
with the idea of injury in the Founding Era.43 Their research laid a 
foundation for the work reported in this article. 
                                                                                                             
 39. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 557 (1992). 
 40. Id. at 557–58. 
 41. Id. at 562 (citation omitted). 
 42. Id. at 573–74. 
 43. Even though the Supreme Court consistently speaks of “case and controversy” as a single unit of 
meaning, those two words appear in different parts of Article III; Kuhn and Abbady focused only on the 
original meaning of case. But see Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Article III’s Case/Controversy Distinction and 
the Dual Functions of Federal Courts, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 447, 448–49 (1994) (marshalling 
historical evidence that in the Founding Era “case” and “controversy” invoked different court roles). 
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Shortly after both Kuhn and Abbady graduated from Georgia State, 
Cunningham became aware that a three-judge panel from the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit had ordered that the following 
letter be sent on May 28, 2019, to the lawyers in Wright v. Spaulding,44 
a case brought by a federal prisoner asking that his sentence be revised:  
1. What is the original meaning of the Article III Cases or 
Controversies requirement? 
2. How does the corpus help inform that determination? 
a. See https://lcl.byu.edu/projects/cofea/. 
3. How does that original meaning relate to the distinction 
between holding and dicta? 
4. How does that ultimate determination relate to which test 
in Hill should govern?45 
This letter appeared to Cunningham to be the first time that an 
American court had asked the parties in a case to do corpus-based 
linguistic research and report the results. Cunningham asked Kuhn and 
Abbady if they were interested in turning Kuhn’s seminar paper into a 
friend of the court (amicus) brief, to be filed in support of neither party. 
After Kuhn and Abbady indicated their interest, a research team, 
comprised of the authors, assembled over the next three months.46 An 
initial amicus brief of only twelve pages was submitted to the court on 
July 25, 2019, along with a motion for leave to appear as amici. This 
initial brief only reported the linguistic analysis of “such other 
questions” discussed below in Section II.B. 
In the motion for leave to appear as amici, the research team 
indicated that page limitations and time constraints prevented them 
from including all their research and that they were continuing to 
analyze the usage of “case” and “cases” in the Founding Era. The 
                                                                                                             
 44. Wright v. Spaulding, 939 F.3d 695 (6th Cir. 2019). 
 45. Letter to Counsel at 1, Wright, 939 F.3d 695 (No. 17-4257). 
 46. Cunningham and Egbert had previously collaborated on an amicus brief on the original meaning 
of “emolument” that was submitted to the Fourth Circuit in support of neither party in In re Trump. See 
Brief of Amici Curiae Professor Clark D. Cunningham and Professor Jesse Egbert on Behalf of Neither 
Party, In re Trump, 928 F.3d 360 (4th Cir. 2019) (No. 18-2486), reh’g en banc granted, 780 F. App’x 36 
(4th Cir. 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3334017. 
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research team, therefore, requested leave to file an additional 
supplemental brief not to exceed twenty-five pages on or before 
August 29, 2019. 
On August 2, 2019, the three-judge panel entered an order 
“direct[ing] the amici to file a supplemental brief no later than August 
15, 2019.”47 This deadline was later extended to August 22.48 The 
authors believe this order was the first time an American court had 
directed a team including expert linguists to submit their corpus-based 
research in the form of a brief. 
The linguistic analysis supporting an alternative interpretation of 
“cases” in Article III as a “shell noun”49 was developed in the three 
weeks following the filing of the preliminary brief and became the 
focus of a supplemental brief on August 22, 2019. 
On September 19, 2019, the Sixth Circuit issued a decision in 
Wright dismissing the petitioner’s habeas case.50 A footnote 
acknowledged that “[a] team of corpus linguistics researchers 
submitted two amicus briefs” and indicated that the court was “grateful 
to . . . the amici for their hard work.”51 However, the court did not end 
up addressing the original meaning of “cases or controversies” in 
Article III in its opinion and made no substantive use of the research 
reported in the two amicus briefs. 
Nevertheless, well before the Wright decision came down, the 
research team had moved forward to use the amicus research as the 
foundation for this article. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                             
 47. Wright, 939 F.3d 695 (No. 17-4257) (order granting motion to proceed as amicus curiae). 
 48. Letter to Counsel Granting Motion to Extend Filing Deadline at 1, Wright, 939 F.3d 695 (No. 17-
4257). 
 49. See infra Section II.C. 
 50. Wright, 939 F.3d at 697. 
 51. Id. at 700 n.1. 
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II.   A Linguistic Analysis of the Original Meaning of “Cases” in 
Article III 
A.  Introduction 
Searches for “case” and “cases” in the entire COFEA database 
produce 93,255 and 31,840 hits, respectively. This is too large a 
number for individualized qualitative analysis and is a daunting data 
set for pattern searching. Methodological approaches include selecting 
randomized samples, narrowing the search query, narrowing the 
source material, and/or using sophisticated linguistic analysis tools to 
look for recurrent patterns around the search term(s). 
The research team’s first steps in determining whether linguistic 
analysis might produce results worth reporting to the Wright panel 
involved COFEA searches using queries where case52 appeared with 
either a pre-modifying adjective (e.g., “criminal case”) or 
post-modifying prepositional phrase (e.g., “cases of debt”). One of the 
more fruitful queries appeared to be a search for the phrase “the case 
of,” which was found to be a dominant pattern around the word “case.” 
Although the team expected that this phrase would be productive of 
examples where case meant something like “lawsuit” (e.g., “the case 
of Smith v. Jones”), the search in fact produced many examples where 
qualitative review suggested case had a broad, generic meaning not 
related to “adversarial litigation.” 
The next step involved a combination of narrowing the source 
material and using analytical methods that go beyond what can be 
accomplished with COFEA’s online tools. The team elected to apply a 
widely-used tool called AntConc53 to search for significant recurrent 
patterns. AntConc requires an offline corpus that can be loaded into the 
tool. Fortunately, Cunningham had already employed a recent 
graduate of Georgia State University’s Applied Linguistics Ph.D. 
                                                                                                             
 52. When italicized, case includes both the singular and plural form. 
 53. AntConc is a program for analyzing electronic texts (that is, corpora) in order to find and reveal 
patterns in language. AntConc, LAURENCE ANTHONY’S WEBSITE, 
https://www.laurenceanthony.net/software [https://perma.cc/8HJN-G3CE] (last visited Nov. 7, 2019). 
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program to create an offline database taken from one of the COFEA 
sources: the National Archives Founders Online. 
Within the offline database derived from Founders Online, the 
research team decided to focus on two sub-corpora: documents from 
the National Archive collections of the papers of James Madison and 
Alexander Hamilton from 1780–1789.54 Both men participated in 
drafting the Constitution at the Constitutional Convention; Madison 
has been described as the “master builder of the Constitution.”55 
Based on the hypothesis that case might appear in similar syntactic 
structures to “cause” and “suit” if it indeed referred to a lawsuit or 
court proceeding, the team used AntConc to search for instances of 
“case,” “cause,” and “suit” followed by the post-modifying features of 
“case” appearing in the original drafting history (e.g., “of,” “which,” 
“in which,” “arising,” etc.). These searches returned total occurrences 
of post-modified “cause” and “suit” that provided sample sizes too 
small (sixty-four and six respectively) for reliable analysis. A more 
adequate sample was produced by searches for post-modified case—
over 400 occurrences. However, in the process of examining the 
examples of post-modified case from the Madison corpus, the 
direction of research shifted when the team focused on the following 
passage found among the “cases arising” samples:  
 
[T]he jurisdiction of the national Judiciary shall extend to 
cases arising under laws passed by the general Legislature, 
and to such other questions as involve the National peace and 
harmony . . . .56 
 
The research team obtained this text from James Madison’s famous 
notes of the Constitutional Convention, published after his death, 
available in the Founders Online database.57 However, in the case of 
                                                                                                             
 54. Madison is the smallest corpus in the Founders Online component of COFEA. 
 55. FARRAND, supra note 16, at 196. 
 56. RECORDS II, supra note 12, at 39. 
 57. James Madison took “full and careful notes of the proceedings in the Convention,” but did not 
allow them to be published until after his death in 1836. Max Farrand, Introduction to 1 THE RECORDS OF 
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this text, Madison’s notes conform to the rather cryptic official Journal 
of the Convention published in 1818, based on papers transferred to 
the Secretary of State by George Washington, who was the presiding 
officer at the Convention.58 
As the team further investigated the context of this text, they 
discovered that it was an important predecessor of the final version of 
Article III of the Constitution.  
B.  Analysis of “such other” 
The Constitution was developed from fifteen resolutions introduced 
during the first week of the Convention, on May 29, 1787, by the 
Virginia delegation (the Virginia Plan).59 James Madison played a 
major role in devising and promoting the Virginia Plan.60 Resolution 
9 addressed the creation of a federal judiciary: 
[T]he jurisdiction of the inferior tribunals shall be to hear & 
determine in the first instance, and of the supreme tribunal 
to hear and determine in the dernier resort, all piracies & 
felonies on the high seas, captures from an enemy; cases in 
which foreigners or citizens of other States applying to such 
jurisdictions may be interested, or which respect the 
collection of the National revenue; impeachments of any 
National officers, and questions which may involve the 
national peace and harmony.61 
On July 18, 1787, the Convention unanimously adopted the text 
discovered by the research team as a simplified version of Resolution 
9: 
 
                                                                                                             
THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at xv (Max Farrand ed., 1911) [hereinafter RECORDS I] (“[A]ll other 
records paled into insignificance [once Madison’s notes were published].”). 
 58.  1 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1786–
1870, at 48, 101 (U.S. Dep’t of State 1894). See RECORDS I, supra note 57, at xi-xii. 
 59. FARRAND, supra note 16, at 122. 
 60. RICHARD BEEMAN, THE PENGUIN GUIDE TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 150 (2010). 
 61. RECORDS I, supra note 57, at 21–22. 
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Original Resolution 9 July 18 Replacement Resolution 
“the jurisdiction of the inferior 
tribunals shall be to hear & 
determine in the first instance, 
and of the supreme tribunal to 
hear and determine in the dernier 
resort, all piracies & felonies on 
the high seas, captures from an 
enemy; cases in which 
foreigners or citizens of other 
States applying to such 
jurisdictions may be interested, 
or which respect the collection 
of the National revenue; 
impeachments of any National 
officers, and questions which 
may involve the national peace 
and harmony.”62 
“the jurisdiction of the national 
Judiciary shall extend to cases 
arising under laws passed by the 
general Legislature,  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
and to such other questions as 
involve the National peace and 
harmony . . .”63 
 
The official Journal did not record who proposed the replacement 
resolution on July 18, but Madison’s notes indicate that it was his 
proposal in response to “[s]everal criticisms having been made” of the 
definition of the jurisdiction of the National Judiciary.64 
On July 27, 1787, the Convention adjourned until August 6, so that 
a Committee of Detail “might have time to arrange, and draw into 
method & form the several matters which had been agreed to by the 
Convention, as a Constitution for the United States.”65 The July 18 
replacement resolution was one of the “matters which had been agreed 
to by the Convention” referred to this Committee. As discussed below, 
                                                                                                             
 62. Id. at 22. 
   63.  RECORDS II, supra note 12, at 39. 
 64. JAMES MADISON, THE DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 WHICH FRAMED THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 279 (2007) [hereinafter MADISON’S NOTES]. 
 65. 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 65 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) 
[hereinafter RECORDS III]; see also RECORDS II, supra note 12, at 65, 67. 
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the draft reported back to the Convention by the committee became the 
template for the Constitution.66 
The team’s linguistic analysis focused on the relationship between 
“cases arising under the laws passed by the general Legislature” and 
“such other questions as involve the National peace and harmony” in 
the July 18 replacement resolution. Based on the understanding of 
“such other” in contemporary language use, one would interpret this 
excerpt from the drafting history to mean that “cases arising under the 
laws passed by the general Legislature” was a type or example of 
“questions as involve the National peace and harmony.” 
In order to determine whether this contemporary understanding of 
the “such other” pattern was consistent with that of the Founding Era, 
the research team then returned to COFEA to examine the frequency 
and function of the “a . . . such other b” pattern in Founding Era 
documents. 
The preliminary search query, “such other */n (noun),” returned 
2,821 hits dispersed throughout COFEA, appearing in every 
sub-corpus, and in each time period. The frequency and extent of this 
dispersion indicated that the phrase, “a . . . such other b,” was 
commonly used and recognized in the Founding Era. 
The research team then moved to an in-depth, qualitative analysis 
of a random sample of 100 occurrences of the pattern generated from 
COFEA sources. Analysis revealed both regular syntactic67 and 
semantic68 features. 
In assessing the semantic meaning of phrases in the form 
“a . . . such other b”, it was clear to the research team that a is always 
a type or example of b. Consider the following text regarding 
extending navigation on the Potomac River found in the papers of 
George Washington: 
                                                                                                             
 66. RECORDS I, supra note 57, at xxiii. 
 67. Syntax describes how words are arranged to construct a sentence. See generally EDWARD 
FINEGAN, LANGUAGE: ITS STRUCTURE AND USE (2015). 
 68. Semantics addresses the meaning of words, phrases, and sentences. See id. 
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[T]he said president and directors . . . shall have full power 
and authority . . . to cut such canals, and erect such locks, 
and perform such other works as they shall judge necessary 
for opening, improving, and extending the navigation of the 
said river . . . .69 
“Cut canals” and “erect locks” are examples of the general category of 
“works” that can be done to improve navigation on a river. 
Phrases using “such other” also have a set syntactic pattern, where 
the more general term b always follows the more specific term(s) a. 
Consider the following example:  
The second plowing . . . will be turned upwards, 
and . . . may be planted with potatoes or such other 
vegetables as may best suit the judicious husbandman’s 
inclination.70 
Potatoes (a) is a specific example from the general category of 
vegetables (b). The syntax cannot be reordered to say, “planted with 
vegetables and such other potatoes.” 
The research team carefully examined all 100 concordance lines 
(i.e., instances of the search string, plus surrounding context) in the 
random sample looking for counterexamples that might disconfirm 
these hypotheses about the semantic and syntactic features of “such 
other” phrases and found none. 
The research team then conducted a second, more extended analysis 
of the “such other” pattern in COFEA.71 For this second, more 
labor-intensive analysis, results coming from the HeinOnline source in 
                                                                                                             
 69. Enclosure II: An Act for Opening and Extending the Navigation of Potowmack River (Oct. 18, 
1784), in 2 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 240, 241 (W.W. Abbot ed., 1992) (emphasis added), 
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/04-02-02-0173-0003 [https://perma.cc/4XHY-
94JB]. 
 70. JOHN SPURRIER, THE PRACTICAL FARMER 33 (1793) (emphasis added). 
 71. In order to broaden the search and gather varied forms in which the target phrase appeared, for 
these next three sets the noun tag was removed from the search query so the search term was just “such 
other.” 
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COFEA were excluded. Currently, it is quite difficult to access the full 
context of concordance lines obtained from HeinOnline through 
COFEA, and the team wanted to be able to review the full context of 
each occurrence.72 
This second search returned 1,395 hits, appearing in a variety of 
different forms. Three additional sets of 100 randomized lines were 
extracted from the total of 1,395 hits and manually reviewed. In many 
instances it was necessary to access the full context to find the “a” that 
corresponded with the “b” following “such other.” Analysis of these 
300 “such other” occurrences showed findings consistent with the 
original sample of “such other */n,” suggesting that regardless of the 
form that the phrase appears in, its function and meaning remain 
consistent. 
The team found five different forms of “a . . . such other b” in the 
samples from the second search. Each form appeared in each of the 
three samples at a similar frequency, suggesting an adequately 
representative sample of the corpus. Forms and their reported 
frequencies are presented in the chart below. 
 
  Sample A Sample B Sample C 
“a . . . such other + noun (b)” 89 87 89 
“a . . . such other + pre-modifier + noun (b)” 8 7 6 
“a . . . such other + of the + noun (b)”  1 3 1 
 “a . . . such other + as” 1 1 3 
“a. Such other b”  1 2 1 
Total 100 100 100 
 
                                                                                                             
 72.  Concordance lines based on HeinOnline source materials are also much more likely to contain 
optical scanning errors and duplicate entries than search results from the other COFEA sources. 
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The function of the phrase, “a such other b,” is consistent in all five 
forms, where a is considered a type, or example of b. No robust 
counterexamples were found within the three samples. In the following 
examples of each of the five patterns discovered in the second search, 
both a and b are bolded for identification. 
 
1)  “a . . . such other + noun (b)” 
[T]he hand and seal of the superintendent of the 
department, or of such other person as the President of the 
United States shall authorize to grant licenses for the 
purpose[.]73 
2)  “a . . . such other + pre-modifier + noun (b)” 
 
In this form, the presence of the pre-modifier preceding the noun 
clearly displayed no alteration of the meaning of the previous form. 
[A]nd proper funds provided, for raising money to cultivate 
our friendship with our Indian neighbors, and to support 
such of our fellow subjects, who are or may be in distress, 
and for such other like benevolent purposes[.]74 
3)  “a . . . such other + of the + noun (b)” 
 
The presence of the preposition before the noun here is clearly 
stylistic, and while the form is different, the function of the form 
remains unaltered. 
                                                                                                             
 73. Sample B, CLARKCUNNINGHAM.ORG 1, 14 l. 58 (Aug. 22, 2019), 
http://www.clarkcunningham.org/JP/Wright-web/SuchOther_COFEA_Sample%20B-annotated-
22Aug2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/29DR-TGR4]. 
 74. Id. at 8 l. 31. 
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I have directed the Marshal . . . to have invoices and such 
other of the shipping papers as are in the trunk faithfully 
translated and authenticated and sent on to me[.]75 
4)     “a . . . such other + as” 
 
Although b is not explicitly stated in the phrase at all, it is naturally 
understood by the reader based on our understanding of the meaning 
of the phrase, “such other,” in context.   
I afterwards wrote him another letter desiring expressly that 
if this route was likely to retard much his attendance on 
Congress, he would take such other as should be shortest.76  
In the above example, the reader naturally understands the text as 
“he would take such other route as should be shortest.” 
 
5)  “a. Such other b” 
 
In lines of this form, “Such other” begins a new sentence. a is still 
present in the text preceding the sentence, and the meaning remains 
unchanged. 
The principal means in the hands of the genl. govmt. for 
encouraging our own manufacturers is to ensure a preference 
and encourage a demand for them by overcharging the 
prices of foreign by heavy duties. Such other means of 
encouragement as have not been confided to the general 
                                                                                                             
 75. Sample A, CLARKCUNNINGHAM.ORG 1, 13 l. 53 (Aug. 21, 2019), 
http://www.clarkcunningham.org/JP/Wright-web/SuchOther_COFEA_Sample%20A-annotated-
21Aug2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/WW7R-XAYH].  
 76. Sample C, CLARKCUNNINGHAM.ORG 1, 1 l. 6 (Aug. 22, 2019), 
http://www.clarkcunningham.org/JP/Wright-web/SuchOther_COFEA_Sample%20C(Annotated)-
22Aug2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/TM74-8XT7]. 
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government must be left with those of states, that each may 
deal them out . . . .77 
With no robust counterexamples appearing in the three 100-line 
samples, the data show that regardless of the form in which the term, 
“a . . . such other b” appears, the meaning and function of the phrase 
remains unchanged where a is considered an example or type of b.   
Further analysis revealed that not only did the form of the phrase, 
“a . . . such other b,” vary without effect on the meaning, the specific 
form and placement of a and b within the passage was similarly 
without effect. While a often appeared as a single or compound noun 
(ex. 1), it more frequently appeared in a form with multiple clauses 
(ex. 2) that were later included by b. This variation in the form of a 
had no effect on the function of the “a . . . such other b.” Consider the 
two examples below: 
ex. 1: [T]he persons I have named be permitted, on the 
morrow, to come before your majesty, in the presence of 
Don Juan, and such other persons as your majesty may 
think fit . . . .78 
 
ex. 2: As I have observed before, Mr. Dodge appears to me 
a valuable intelligencer; and, if Congress are pleased to 
honor him with an opportunity, he will give them an account 
of the posts of Detroit and Niagara when he left them, 
and of that at Michilimachinac,—of the enemy’s naval 
force on Lakes Erie and Ontario, and of such other 
matters in Canada as he was able to inform himself of . . . .79  
Similarly, while a often appeared in a series with b (ex. 3), it more 
frequently appeared somewhere in the text preceding b (ex. 4). Further 
                                                                                                             
 77. Sample B, supra note 73, at 10 l. 40. 
 78. Id. at 16 l. 66. 
 79. Sample C, supra note 76, at 9 l. 49. 
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examination of these instances similarly showed no effect on the 
function of the phrase. Consider the examples below: 
ex. 3: This is true, but in order to make this Demand, France 
must agree by Treaty to open all her Ports in the west Indies, 
to give us a Right to import into them Flour, Bread, 
Tobacco, and such other articles as Great Britain shall 
permit[.]80 
 
ex. 4: Courts of sessions, common pleas, and orphans 
courts shall be held quarterly in each city and county; and 
legislature shall have power to establish all such other courts 
as they may judge for the good of the inhabitants of the 
state[.]81 
Applying these research findings to the July 18 resolution leads to 
these conclusions: 
 
(1) For the members of the Convention who considered and 
unanimously adopted the July 18 resolution, (a) “cases 
arising under laws passed by the general Legislature” 
was a type or example of (b) “questions as involve the 
National peace and harmony;” and 
(2) “other questions as involve the National peace and 
harmony” (b) was a more general category of jurisdiction 
than “cases arising under laws passed by the general 
Legislature” (a). 
 
Due to time and space constraints, the linguistic analysis reported in 
the initial amicus brief submitted to the Wright panel was largely 
limited to these findings about the use of the “such other” pattern. 
                                                                                                             
 80. Sample A, supra note 75, at 1 l. 2. 
 81. Sample C, supra note 76, at 4 l. 25. 
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C.  Case Used as a Shell Noun 
After filing the preliminary brief, the team returned to a further 
bottom-up analysis of the public papers of James Madison,82 this time 
using AntConc to look generally for phrases containing “case” or 
“cases” that were of high frequency. The team considered a phrase to 
be of “high frequency” if it appeared more than fifty times and in more 
than ten different texts.83 
This search produced 8,900 examples of “case” and 3,024 examples 
of “cases.” Analyses showed that uses of both “case” and “cases” were 
highly patterned, meaning both words occurred repeatedly in the same 
phrases. Over 79% of all occurrences of “case” (7,066/8,900) appeared 
in one of twenty-three highly frequently recurrent phrases; 36% of all 
occurrences of “cases” (1,088/3,024) appeared in one of ten frequently 
recurrent phrases.84 Random samples respectively for “case” and 
“cases,” each containing one-fifth of the total examples of each word, 
were then subjected to line-by-line manual review. 
The manual review brought to mind the term “shell noun,” 
introduced by Hans-Jörg Schmid.85 Schmid developed this 
terminology to help explain why many of the most commonly used 
nouns in English can be hard to define.86 In listing such nouns, Schmid 
begins the list with case on two separate occasions.87 
When a word is used as a shell noun, it is hard to define because the 
noun becomes semantically abstract and vague, and is not used to bring 
a specific inherent meaning to the context but instead serves to 
                                                                                                             
 82. For this analysis, the team did not restrict itself to a particular time period but searched all the 
public papers of James Madison downloaded from Founders Online (27,416 files containing 10,876,580 
words). 
 83. The second criterion excludes phrases that appear more than fifty times but only in a few 
documents. 
 84. Tables listing all these patterns can be found in an online appendix posted in the Original Meaning 
of Cases. The Original Meaning of “Cases” in Article III of the US Constitution, 
CLARKCUNNINGHAM.ORG, http://www.clarkcunningham.org/MeaningOfCases.html 
[https://perma.cc/N55J-UCBD] (last visited Oct. 9, 2019) [hereinafter Meaning of Cases]. 
 85. HANS-JÖRG SCHMID, ENGLISH ABSTRACT NOUNS AS CONCEPTUAL SHELLS: FROM CORPUS TO 
COGNITION 13 (2000). 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 3, 6. 
 
24
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 5 [2020], Art. 8
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol36/iss5/8
2020] QUESTIONS INVOLVING NATIONAL PEACE AND HARMONY 559 
introduce and characterize what Schmid calls “chunks of 
information”88 found elsewhere in that context. The noun functions to 
form a “shell” around such (often complex) “chunks of information,” 
which are “contained” within that “shell” providing the “shell 
content.”89 Thus, when a noun like case is used as a shell noun, it 
creates in combination with the shell content a complete notion, but 
one that is entirely contingent on the particular context of use. 
Consider the following two examples used in the same text, a letter 
written by Madison in 1805 when he served as Secretary of State in 
the Jefferson Administration: 
In all cases where there may be no special grounds for 
suspecting an escape of the offender, by the departure of 
the vessel of war, or the removal of him beyond the reach 
of your warrant, you are to take no step towards applying 
the extraordinary force authorised by the law, until you shall 
receive such further directions as the President shall, in 
consequence of your report, think proper to be given.90  
 
Whatever may be the result of these proceedings, you are, 
without delay, to transmit a full and exact report thereof to 
this department; and even to report for the information of the 
President, any important circumstance which may occur in 
the course of them; particularly in cases where there may 
possibly be time for his directions thereon to be received 
and pursued.91 
The shell content in each example is bolded and is notably complex, 
especially in the first example. The significance of “cases” is clearly 
different in the first and second example, even though occurring in the 
                                                                                                             
 88. Id. at 14. 
 89. Id. at 8. 
 90. Circular Letter to the Marshals (May 29, 1805), in 9 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 414, 415 
(Mary A. Hackett et al. eds., 2011) (emphasis added), 
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/02-09-02-0465 [https://perma.cc/KL9H-NR7A]. 
 91. Id. (emphasis added).  
25
Ren et al.: "Questions Involving National Peace and Harmony" or "Injured Plai
Published by Reading Room, 2020
560 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:Spec. Issue 
same short letter, because the shell content is different for each use of 
“cases.” Looking at the second example, it is particularly clear that 
“cases” does not bring any inherent meaning to the sentence; the 
bolded shell content is necessary to give meaning to “cases.” If the 
shell content is removed, the concluding phrase, “particularly in 
cases,” no longer makes sense. 
Schmid conducted a systematic empirical analysis of a very large 
corpus of contemporary English to identify patterns likely to signal the 
usage of a shell-noun phrase.92 One of the strongest patterns he found 
was “noun” + “‘wh’ word” (where, when, why) + clause,93 which is 
the pattern seen in both examples above. The research team found 
eighty-two examples of the pattern, “in cases where,” in the Madison 
corpus, typically followed by a clause. It was seeing patterns like this 
that brought the shell-noun theory to mind. 
The team’s manual review of one-fifth of the samples of “case” and 
“cases” in the Madison corpus generally confirmed that case was used 
pervasively as a shell noun in ways consistent with Schmid’s analysis 
of the use of shell-noun phrases in contemporary English.94 
When considering a text from the Founding Era that clearly has a 
legal context—like Article III—a reader may be “primed”95 to assume 
that case brings to the context an inherent meaning, like “adversarial 
litigation.” However, a careful reading of the entire context may reveal 
that the meaning of case has to be understood instead as forming a 
“shell” around content found elsewhere in the text. Take, for example, 
this phrase from the Articles of Confederation in the section setting out 
                                                                                                             
 92. See SCHMID, supra note 85, at 38–62. 
 93. Id. at 22, 44. A clause can be extracted from the sentence in which it is embedded and expressed 
as an independent, complete sentence, and therefore must always include a verb phrase, e.g., “There may 
possibly be time for his directions thereon to be received and pursued” extracted from the second example 
quoted above. See generally DOUGLAS BIBER, SUSAN CONRAD,  & GEOFFREY LEACH, LONGMAN 
STUDENT GRAMMAR OF SPOKEN AND WRITTEN ENGLISH (2002). 
 94. See Meaning of Cases, supra note 84 for additional sample shell-noun phrases from the Madison 
Papers. 
 95. Words can be “primed” for semantic association; such priming is sensitive to the domain in which 
a word is encountered. Michael Hoey, Lexical Priming and the Properties of Text, in CORPORA AND 
DISCOURSE 385 (A. Partington et al. eds., 2004). Thus, priming to associate “case” with “adversarial 
litigation” is particularly likely if the reader has legal training. 
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a very complicated process for resolving disputes between two states: 
“the judgment or sentence and other proceedings being in either case 
transmitted to congress.”96 Read in isolation and preceded by 
“judgment,” “sentence,” and “proceedings,” “either case” could easily 
be interpreted by a twenty-first century reader as referring to two 
alternate instances of litigation. But when the fuller context is 
examined, it becomes clear that “either case” instead refers to two 
complicated contingencies peculiar to this particular context, which 
together provide the essential shell content for “either case”: 
Contingency 1: [I]f either party shall neglect to attend at the 
day appointed, without showing reasons, which congress 
shall judge sufficient, or being present shall refuse to strike, 
the congress shall proceed to nominate three persons out of 
each state, and the secretary of congress shall strike in behalf 
of such party absent or refusing; and the judgment and 
sentence of the court to be appointed, in the manner before 
prescribed, shall be final and conclusive[.] . . .97 
 
Contingency 2: [A]nd if any of the parties shall refuse to 
submit to the authority of such court, or to appear or defend 
their claim or cause, the court shall nevertheless proceed to 
pronounce sentence, or judgment, which shall in like manner 
be final and decisive[.] . . .98 
At this point the research team had reached a working hypothesis 
that there is a plausible alternative to the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of “cases” in Article III as meaning “injured plaintiff 
litigation.” That alternative interpretation is that “cases” in Article III 
functions as part of shell-noun phrases. “Cases” would thus bring no 
inherent meaning to its use in Article III and would have different 
meanings for each differing shell content in that text. 
                                                                                                             
 96. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IX. 
 97. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IX. 
 98. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IX. 
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To test this hypothesis, the research team conducted a top-down, 
computerized search of the entire COFEA database for every text using 
one of the three patterns that follow the Article III phrase, “the judicial 
power shall extend to”: (1) all cases arising, (2) all cases affecting, and 
(3) all cases of.99 This search produced seventy-nine examples of “all 
cases arising,” fifty examples of “all cases affecting,” and 608 
examples of “all cases of.” 
Because of the small number of examples for “arising” and 
“affecting,” the team was able to conduct a comprehensive manual 
review. First, each example was classified as to whether it was either 
an exact duplicate of the Article III text or obviously a discussion of 
that text, leaving a remainder to be analyzed: 
 
 Duplicate of 
Article III 
Example is 
discussing 
Article III 
Remainder Total 
arising 49 25 5 79 
affecting 42 6 2 50 
 
This result suggests that the formulations “all cases arising” and “all 
cases affecting” were very unusual in the Founding Era outside the 
specific context of Article III, though they did occur. 
Analysis of the remaining examples, including examination of 
surrounding text in the original sources, indicated that every use in the 
full COFEA database of either “all cases arising under” or “all cases 
affecting” that was not derived from Article III was a shell-noun 
phrase.100 Take, for example, this excerpt from a medical treatise: 
It is evident to the most superficial observer, that the 
sensibility, and irritability of every part of the body, are 
                                                                                                             
 99. For “arising” and “affecting,” the search captured all phrases in which “all cases” preceded the 
verb by up to five words, accounting for the possibility of intervening words such as the phrase “both in 
law and equity,” which separates “all cases” from “arising” in Article III. 
100.  Each example was independently classified as a shell-noun phrase by Ren, Abbady, and 
Cunningham using common criteria derived from Schmid. See Meaning of Cases, supra note 84 for all 
seven “remainder” examples. One of the five examples in the “arising” chart appears twice because it was 
downloaded from two different sources. 
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rendered less susceptible of impressions, by the use of 
opium.  
In all cases of pain arising from any cause, except that 
from inflammation, it is a sure and never failing palliative, 
and generally succeeds in procuring sleep, if given in doses 
sufficiently large . . . .101 
According to this analysis, then, if the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation is applied to “all cases arising” and “all cases affecting” 
in Article III, Article III would be the only text among the over 126,000 
texts in COFEA where these phrases were not shell-noun usages. 
Turning to the much larger set of 608 examples of “all cases of,” the 
first step reduced the number of examples by about one-third by 
removing all texts downloaded from HeinOnline. Because 
identification of whether an example was a shell-noun phrase often 
included viewing the full original contexts in the underlying source, 
HeinOnline-sourced examples were removed because of the difficulty 
in accessing full original texts from HeinOnline through COFEA.102 
For the next step, the team extracted from the remaining 336 
examples of “all cases of” three random samples of twenty 
concordance lines per sample, a total of sixty lines.103 Manual review 
of each randomized sample set indicated that every line represented 
the use of case as a shell-noun phrase.104 Take for example: 
                                                                                                             
101.  WILLIAM CURRIE, OBSERVATIONS ON THE CAUSES AND CURE OF REMITTING OR BILIOUS 
FEVERS 75 (Philadelphia, William T. Palmer 1798) (emphasis added). 
102.  Two hundred forty-two HeinOnline-based lines were excluded from the total data set of 608. 
Texts sourced from HeinOnline also present far more instances of duplicated lines and severe Optical 
Character Recognition (OCR) corruption making recourse to the underlying texts all the more necessary. 
The research team did not believe that exclusion of HeinOnline-sourced lines rendered the remaining 
examples unrepresentative of Founding Era usage; nonetheless, all the excluded HeinOnline concordance 
lines are posted on the Meaning of Cases website. 
103.  The random samples were extracted from Excel file by using the function EXCEL “= RAND( )”. 
A column containing this function was inserted in the original spreadsheet of 335 lines, then, to extract 
three samples, the sorting function was used with each time a new random number was automatically 
assigned to each row by the function = RAND(). 
104.  Each example was initially classified as a shell-noun phrase by Ren, then double-checked by 
Abbady; Cunningham provided occasional consultation. See Meaning of Cases, supra note 84 for tables 
displaying each randomized sample set. 
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[T]he court of wardens shall and may have, hold, and exercise, the 
same powers and authorities in all cases of debt or damage, by 
whatever means sustained, and which do not exceed in value 
20 / (except where the title to lands may come in question,) as 
the judges of the court of common pleas or admiralty have, 
hold, or do exercise, in their respective jurisdictions.105 
III.   Applying Linguistic Analysis to Founding Era Texts 
A.  Predecessor Texts to the Constitution 
During the drafting process, the Constitutional Convention relied 
significantly on the Articles of Confederation and state 
constitutions.106 In this section, we look at the use of case in the 
Articles of Confederation and in two influential state constitutions as 
evidence of language use that can be considered comparable to how 
those who drafted and ratified the U.S. Constitution used language. We 
find in these documents that case was used often and apparently as a 
shell noun. 
Case appears six times in the Articles of Confederation and is used 
each time as an abstract noun that acquires significance only through 
its combination with one or more accompanying phrases.  
In two occurrences, the information that completes the meaning 
follows case: 
 
(1) [R]ules for deciding in all cases, what captures on land or 
water shall be legal, and in what manner prizes taken by land 
or naval forces in the service of the united states shall be 
divided or appropriated . . . . 
(2) [E]stablishing courts for receiving and determining finally 
appeals in all cases of captures . . . . 
 
 
                                                                                                             
105.  Zylstra v. Corp. of Charleston, 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 382, 394 (Ct. Com. Pl. 1794) (emphasis added). 
106.  FARRAND, supra note 16, at 127–29. 
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In two other instances, the complementary information immediately 
precedes case: 
 
(3) [U]nless such state be infested by pirates, in which case 
vessels of war may be fitted out for that occasion . . . . 
(4) [U]nless the legislature of such state shall judge that such 
extra number cannot be safely spared out of the same, in 
which case they shall raise officer, cloath, arm and equip as 
many of such extra number as they judge can be safely spared. 
 
And in two occurrences, very complex information precedes case, 
in one instance in a completely different article: 
 
(5) [I]f either party shall neglect to attend at the day appointed, 
without showing reasons, which congress shall judge 
sufficient, or being present shall refuse to strike, the 
congress shall proceed to nominate three persons out of each 
state, and the secretary of congress shall strike in behalf of 
such party absent or refusing; and the judgment and 
sentence of the court to be appointed, in the manner before 
prescribed, shall be final and conclusive; and if any of the 
parties shall refuse to submit to the authority of such court, 
or to appear or defend their claim or cause, the court shall 
nevertheless proceed to pronounce sentence, or judgment, which 
shall in like manner be final and decisive, the judgment or 
sentence and other proceedings being in either case transmitted 
to congress . . . . 
(6) Article VI:  No state shall engage in any war without the consent 
of the united states in Congress assembled, unless such state be 
actually invaded by enemies, or shall have received certain 
advice of a resolution being formed by some nation of 
Indians to invade such state, and the danger is so imminent 
as not to admit of a delay till the united states in congress 
assembled can be consulted: nor shall any state grant 
commissions to any ships or vessels of war, nor letters of marque 
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or reprisal, except it be after a declaration of war by the 
united states in congress assembled, and then only against 
the kingdom or state and the subjects thereof, against which 
war has been so declared, and under such regulations as 
shall be established by the united states in congress 
assembled . . . . 
. . . . 
Article IX: The united states in congress assembled, shall have 
the sole and exclusive right and power of determining on peace 
and war, except in the cases mentioned in the sixth 
article . . . .107 
 
 The famous 1776 Constitution of Virginia, adopted even before the 
Declaration of Independence, uses case a number of times, but always 
as part of a shell-noun phrase that is obviously not referring to 
adversarial litigation.108 
 
That a well-regulated militia, composed of the body of the 
people, trained to arms, is the proper, natural, and safe 
defence of a free State; that standing armies, in time of peace, 
should be avoided, as dangerous to liberty; and that in all 
cases the military should be under strict subordination to, 
and governed by, the civil power.109 
 . . . . 
Whereas George the third, King of Great Britain and Ireland, 
and elector of Hanover, heretofore intrusted with the 
exercise of the kingly office in this government, hath 
endeavoured to prevent, the same into a detestable and 
insupportable tyranny, by putting his negative on laws the 
most wholesome and necessary for the public good[.]  
 . . . . 
                                                                                                             
107.   ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. VI, IX. 
108.   See generally VA. CONST. of 1776. 
109.   VA. CONST. of 1776, § 13. 
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For suspending our own legislatures, and declaring 
themselves invested with power to legislate for us in all 
cases whatsoever[.] 
 . . . . 
A Governor, or chief magistrate, shall be chosen annually by 
joint ballot of both Houses (to be taken in each House 
respectively) deposited in the conference room; the boxes 
examined jointly by a committee of each House, and the 
numbers severally reported to them, that the appointments 
may be entered (which shall be the mode of taking the joint 
ballot of both Houses, in all cases) . . . . [The Governor] 
shall, with the advice of the Council of State, have the power 
of granting reprieves or pardons, except where the 
prosecution shall have been carried on by the House of 
Delegates, or the law shall otherwise particularly direct: in 
which cases, no reprieve or pardon shall be granted, but by 
resolve of the House of Delegates. 
 . . . . 
. . . They shall annually choose, out of their own members, a 
President, who, in case of death, inability, or absence of the 
Governor from the government, shall act as 
Lieutenant-Governor.  
. . . . 
. . . In case of death, incapacity, or resignation, the 
Governor, with the advice of the Privy Council, shall appoint 
persons to succeed in office, to be approved or displaced by 
both Houses. . . . 
 
The Governor, with the advice of the Privy Council, shall 
appoint Justices of the Peace for the counties; and in case of 
vacancies, or a necessity of increasing the number hereafter, 
such appointments to be made upon the recommendation of 
the respective County Courts. . . . In case of vacancies, 
either by death, incapacity, or resignation, a Secretary shall 
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be appointed, as before directed; and the Clerks, by the 
respective Courts. 
. . . . 
. . . In case of vacancies, the Speaker of either House shall 
shall [sic] issue writs for new elections.110 
In the section stating that trial by jury “ought to be held sacred,” the 
Virginia Constitution uses the words “controversies” and “suits” rather 
than “cases.”111 
That in controversies respecting property, and in suits 
between man and man, the ancient trial by jury is preferable 
to any other, and ought to be held sacred.112 
The state constitution considered to have the greatest influence on 
the drafting of the U.S. Constitution was the 1780 Constitution of 
Massachusetts, largely written by John Adams.113 In a provision 
apparently based on the Virginia protection of the right to trial by jury, 
Adams also used “controversies” and “suits” and added the word 
“causes”: 
Art. XV. In all controversies concerning property, and in all 
suits between two or more persons, except in cases in which 
it has heretofore been otherways used and practised, the 
parties have a right to a trial by jury; and this method of 
procedure shall be held sacred, unless, in causes arising on 
the high seas, and such as relate to mariners’ wages, the 
legislature shall hereafter find it necessary to alter it.114 
                                                                                                             
110.   VA. CONST. of 1776, § 16. 
111.   VA. CONST. of 1776, § 11. 
112.   VA. CONST. of 1776, § 11. 
113.   John Adams & the Massachusetts Constitution, MASS.GOV, https://www.mass.gov/guides/john-
adams-the-massachusetts-constitution [https://perma.cc/ND2A-F6RH] (last visited Oct. 9, 2019). 
114.   MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. I, art. XV. 
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The word “cases” also appears once in this provision, which is part of 
a prefatory “Declaration of Rights,” but can be seen as functioning as 
part of a shell-noun phrase. 
When later in the Massachusetts Constitution its Article III 
establishes the judicial power, it uses a laundry list of words but does 
not include “cases”: 
Art. III. The general court shall forever have full power and 
authority to erect and constitute judicatories and courts of 
record or other courts . . . for the hearing, trying, and 
determining of all manner of crimes, offences, pleas, 
processes, plaints, actions, matters, causes, and things 
whatsoever.115 
B.  Drafting History of the Constitution  
We now return to a more extensive review of the drafting history of 
Article III at the Constitutional Convention. In the course of this 
review, we feel that we have reconstructed a useful narrative of how 
Article III came to take its final form, and in particular how the drafters 
made the transition from talking in terms of “questions as involve the 
National peace and harmony” to instead using “cases” recurrently. 
Although it might appear in some parts of this section that we are 
trying to infer the intent of some of the delegates, we are doing so 
primarily in the context of trying to understand their language usage. 
As Madison advised, the words used by “[those who] prepared and 
proposed the Constitution” can be considered as “presumptive 
evidence of the general understanding at the time of the language 
used.”116 
Reviewing texts from the Constitutional Convention reveals a 
number of examples of language use consistent with an interpretation 
that “cases” was being used as a shell noun. Indeed, the shell-noun 
interpretation provides a plausible explanation for statements by 
delegates that would otherwise be puzzling if “cases” was being used 
                                                                                                             
115.   MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. II, ch. 1, § 1, art. III (emphasis added). 
116.   Letter from James Madison to Martin L. Hurlbut, supra note 17. 
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and understood as having the “injured plaintiff litigation” meaning the 
Supreme Court assumed was intended. 
As discussed above, Article III has its origins in the ninth of fifteen 
resolutions introduced on May 29, 1787, during the first week of the 
Constitutional Convention by Virginia Governor Edmund Randolph 
on behalf of the Virginia delegation—the Virginia Plan.117 Resolution 
9 proposed that “a National Judiciary be established to consist of one 
or more supreme tribunals, and of inferior tribunals to be chosen by 
the National Legislature.”118 The “jurisdiction of the inferior tribunals” 
was to hear and determine in the first instance:  
[1] all piracies & felonies on the high seas, [2] captures from 
an enemy; [3] cases in which foreigners or citizens of other 
States applying to such jurisdictions may be interested, or 
which respect the collection of the National revenue; [4] 
impeachments of any National officers, and [5] questions 
which may involve the national peace and harmony.119 
The supreme tribunal would have jurisdiction to hear and determine 
such matters “in the dernier resort.”120 
Resolution 9 used case to describe only one of five categories of 
jurisdiction. This use, for the third category, occurs in what Schmid 
identified as a shell-noun pattern—“noun + which”—that occurs with 
case.121 This use of case appears to form a “shell” around two very 
different, complicated ideas that form the “shell content”: (1) 
situations of interest to foreigners and “citizens of other states applying 
to such jurisdiction”; and (2) situations “respect[ing] the collection of 
the National revenue.” 
The first part of this shell content seems to identify “foreigners or 
citizens of other States applying to such jurisdictions” as the persons 
                                                                                                             
117.   RECORDS I, supra note 57, at 21–22. 
118.   Id. at 21. 
119.   Id. at 22. 
120.   Id. 
121.   SCHMID, supra note 85, at 289. 
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who would be able to invoke federal jurisdiction, but the basis for 
invoking jurisdiction is stated as whether such persons “may be 
interested,” a phrase that seems quite distant from the Supreme Court’s 
insistence that federal courts are only available to plaintiffs who have 
suffered a concrete and particularized injury.122 
The second part of this shell content reads “cases . . . which respect 
the collection of National revenue,” a jurisdictional category that has 
no apparent connection with the first part other than being within the 
same shell-noun phrase introduced by “cases.”123 However, it is in fact 
characteristic of shell-noun phrases to combine two or more very 
different ideas into a single complex concept, the meaning of which is 
entirely specific to that particular context.124 It is not at all clear who 
would be able to invoke federal jurisdiction “respect[ing] the 
collection of National revenue” and what federal courts would be 
expected to do in relation to such matters. Like the first part of the shell 
content, this second part does not obviously refer to “injured plaintiff 
litigation.” 
For the last jurisdictional category, Resolution 9 used a phrase 
beginning with the word “questions.” According to Schmid, 
“question” is very commonly used in contemporary English as a shell 
noun, and the construction “noun + which” is also a typical shell-noun 
pattern.125 “Questions” in the fifth category certainly appears to be a 
vague and abstract noun that functions to form a shell around a 
complex set of ideas: “which may involve the national peace and 
harmony.” 
The analysis presented above about the use of “such other” in the 
phrase “cases arising under laws passed by the general Legislature, 
and to such other questions as involve the National peace and 
harmony” indicated that the Convention delegates understood “cases 
arising under laws passed by the general Legislature” to be a type or 
example of the more general jurisdictional category, “questions as 
involve the National peace and harmony.” Our shell-noun analysis 
                                                                                                             
122.   Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992).  
123.   RECORDS I, supra note 57, at 21–22. 
124.   SCHMID, supra note 85, at 14, 80, 370. 
125.   Id. at 4, 62. 
37
Ren et al.: "Questions Involving National Peace and Harmony" or "Injured Plai
Published by Reading Room, 2020
572 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:Spec. Issue 
indicates that if “case” or “question” are being used as shell nouns, the 
meaning of the phrase they introduce comes primarily from the 
shell-noun content and not from the vague noun that introduces the 
phrase. If we combine the insights from both analyses, we would not 
be surprised if the drafters used “cases involving national peace and 
harmony” and “questions involving national peace and harmony” to 
express the same concept. And indeed, we find two examples where 
influential delegates did shift from talking about “questions involving 
national peace and harmony” to “cases involving national peace and 
harmony” while still apparently referring to the same concept. 
1.  Shifting from Questions to Cases: Example One 
The first example comes from reported discussion of a revised 
version of Resolution 9, which Governor Randolph and James 
Madison offered on June 13, 1787: 
[T]he jurisdiction of the national Judiciary shall extend to [1] 
cases which respect the collection of the national revenue, 
[2] impeachments of any national officers, and [3] questions 
which involve the national peace and harmony.126 
The jurisdiction that would be established by this resolution can be 
interpreted as described by two shell-noun phrases, introduced 
respectively by “cases” and “questions,” plus the specific category 
identified by the noun “impeachments.” 
According to Madison’s notes, on June 16, 1787, James Wilson of 
Pennsylvania127 rose to compare the June 13 resolution by Randolph 
and Madison with a very different proposal for federal courts 
introduced as part of a June 15 resolution by William Patterson of New 
                                                                                                             
126.   RECORDS I, supra note 57, at 223–24.  
127.   Wilson, an accomplished lawyer and one of the most influential delegates at the Convention, 
was one of the original signers of the Declaration of Independence and served on the Convention’s 
Committee of Detail, as discussed below. He was one of the first persons appointed to the Supreme Court 
by George Washington and also served as the first professor of law at the College of Philadelphia (the 
predecessor of the University of Pennsylvania). See FARRAND, supra note 16, at 21. 
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Jersey. As Randolph was the spokesperson for the “large states” 
Virginia Plan, Patterson was the proponent for the “New Jersey Plan,” 
offered as a “small states” alternative.128 Wilson said: 
Here [in the Randolph/Madison resolution,] the jurisdiction 
is to extend to all cases affecting the Natl. peace & 
harmony:—there [in the Patterson resolution,] a few cases 
only are marked out.129 
The brief statement by Wilson is consistent with the linguistic 
analysis of this article in two ways. First, his statement suggests that 
he understood “questions which involve the national peace and 
harmony” to be a general jurisdictional category that included more 
specific categories that preceded it, such as the category introduced 
with the word “cases.” Thus, Wilson collapsed the three different 
jurisdictional categories, listed in the June 13 resolution, into one 
category, using the phrase “affecting the National peace and 
harmony.” 
Second, the statement by Wilson also suggests that he considered 
“cases affecting the national harmony” as including the same concept 
as “questions affecting the national harmony.” He described the 
federal jurisdiction proposed by Randolph and Madison by quoting the 
language of their resolution referring to “National peace and 
harmony,” but substituted “cases” where the June 13 resolution used 
“questions”: 
 
June 13 Resolution Wilson’s Paraphrase 
“the jurisdiction of the national 
Judiciary shall extend to cases 
which respect the collection of 
the national revenue, 
“the jurisdiction is to extend to 
all cases affecting the Natl. 
peace & harmony”131 
                                                                                                             
128.   Id. at 84–90. 
129.   RECORDS I, supra note 57, at 252. 
131.   Id. at 252. 
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impeachments of any national 
officers, and questions which 
involve the national peace and 
harmony.”130 
2.  Shifting from Questions to Cases: Example Two  
On June 19, 1787, the Convention voted to reject the New Jersey 
Plan and report out the resolutions offered by Governor Randolph on 
June 13.132 On July 18, the Convention unanimously approved a 
resolution presented by James Madison to amend the June 13 
resolution to read: “the jurisdiction of the national Judiciary shall 
extend to cases arising under laws passed by the general Legislature, 
and to such other questions as involve the National peace and 
harmony.”133 
On July 27, 1787, the Convention adjourned until August 6, so that 
a Committee of Detail “might have time to arrange, and draw into 
method & form the several matters which had been agreed to by the 
Convention, as a Constitution for the United States.”134 The 
Committee of Detail was comprised of five delegates: Governor 
Randolph, James Wilson, Oliver Ellsworth (a judge of the Connecticut 
Supreme Court), Nathaniel Gorham of Massachusetts (a former 
president of the Continental Congress), and John Rutledge (former 
Governor of South Carolina).135 
No official journal of this Committee’s proceedings exists; 
however, a number of documents apparently relating to the 
Committee’s work have survived.136 One such document was 
handwritten by Governor Randolph. Max Farrand, who prepared the 
                                                                                                             
130.   Id. at 231. 
132.   RECORDS III, supra note 65, at 312–13. 
133.   Id.; see also RECORDS II, supra note 12, at 39. The official Journal did not record who made this 
second motion, which also passed unanimously, but Madison’s Notes indicate that it was his proposal, in 
response to “several criticisms having been made” on the definition of the jurisdiction of the national 
judiciary. MADISON’S NOTES, supra note 64.   
134.   RECORDS II, supra note 12, at 65; RECORDS III, supra note 65, at 65, 67. 
135.   FARRAND, supra note 16, at 16–35, 122. 
136.   RECORDS II, supra note 12, at 129. 
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authoritative compilation of the Convention’s records,137 provides this 
explanation for the Randolph document: 
[Although] little has been known of how the committee set 
about the preparation of its report. 
 . . . .  
. . . it seems probable that one of the first steps taken was to 
have some one of their [members] prepare a preliminary 
sketch of a constitution as a working basis upon which the 
committee could proceed. . . . In view of the part he had 
taken first in presenting and at various times in expounding 
on the Virginia plan, Randolph was a very natural person to 
whom this duty should be assigned. . . . [W]e have in 
Randolph’s handwriting what is evidently the first draft of a 
constitution based specifically upon the resolutions the 
convention had adopted.138 
Randolph’s draft includes a section that begins “insert the II article” 
and in that section, below a heading entitled “The Judiciary,” appears 
Paragraph 7.139 In drafting Paragraph 7, he apparently was working 
from the July 18 Resolution. The first seven lines of his draft largely 
parallel the July 18 Resolution, with four changes: (1) the grant of 
jurisdiction is changed from “the national judiciary” to “the supreme 
tribunal”;140 (2) “impeachments of officers” is added after “cases 
arising under laws”; (3) “such other questions” is changed to “such 
other cases”; and (4) “such other cases” is modified by the phrase “as 
the national legislature may assign.”141 
 
                                                                                                             
137.   See generally RECORDS I, supra note 57; RECORDS II, supra note 12. 
138.   FARRAND, supra note 16, at 124–25. 
139.   RECORDS II, supra note 12, at 144–46. 
140.   In the subsequent Paragraph 8, Randolph’s draft would leave to the discretion of Congress 
whether to extend the jurisdiction extended to the “supreme tribunal” to “inferior tribunals”: “The whole 
or a part of the jurisdiction aforesaid according to the discretion of the legislature may be assigned to the 
inferior tribunals, as original tribunals.” Id. at 147. 
141.   Id. at 146–47. 
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July 18 
Resolution 
Randolph’s Draft 
“the jurisdiction 
of the national 
Judiciary shall 
extend to cases 
arising under 
laws passed by 
the general 
Legislature, and 
to such other 
questions as 
involve the 
National peace 
and 
harmony.”142 
“The jurisdiction of the supreme tribunal shall 
extend 
1 to all cases, arising under laws passed by the 
 general (Legislature) 
2. to impeachments of officers, and 
3. to such other cases, as the national 
legislature may assign, as involving the 
national peace and harmony, 
 in the collection of the revenue 
 in disputes between citizens 
      of different states 
in disputes between a State & a Citizen or 
Citizens of another State 
 in disputes between different 
      states; and 
 in disputes, in which subjects or citi- 
 zens of other countries are concerned 
 (& in Cases of Admiralty Jurisdn) 
But this supreme jurisdiction shall be 
appellate only, except in <Cases of Impeachmt. 
&(in)> those instances, in which the legislature 
shall make it original. and the legislature shall 
organize it” 143 
 
Since the Committee of Detail’s task was to implement the 
resolutions approved by the Convention, and two resolutions 
introduced by Randolph himself extended federal jurisdiction to 
“questions involving national peace and harmony,”144 it seems 
                                                                                                             
142.   Id. at 39 (emphasis added). 
143.   Id. at 146–47 (emphasis added) (pattern of indentation in original). 
144.   See supra notes 59–64 and accompanying text (discussing Resolution 9 of the Virginia Plan 
introduced May 29, 1787); supra note 133 and accompanying text (discussing the resolution introduced 
June 13, 1787). 
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unlikely that Randolph intended to make a substantive change in 
federal jurisdiction when he replaced “questions” in the July 18 
Resolution with “cases” in his draft for the Committee of Detail. It 
seems far more likely that, like his fellow Committee of Detail member 
James Wilson,145 Randolph considered he could construct a phrase 
beginning with either “cases” or “questions” to refer to the same 
concept of federal jurisdiction. 
In Randolph’s draft, the pattern of indentation (reproduced in the 
table above) suggests that the phrases that follow “such other cases, as 
the national legislature may assign, as involving the national peace and 
harmony”—e.g., collection of revenue, disputes between citizens of 
different states—were considered by him to be examples of questions 
or cases that involve national peace and harmony. 
3.   Madison’s Puzzling Objection to “Cases Arising Under the 
Constitution” 
On August 6, 1787, the Convention reconvened to receive the 
Committee’s proposed draft of the Constitution.146 Article X of the 
Committee’s draft bears strong resemblance to the draft Randolph 
wrote for the Committee; however, the phrase “involving the national 
peace and harmony” has disappeared as has the reference to 
“collection of revenue.”147 
 
Randolph’s Draft148 Art. X, Committee Draft149 
“The jurisdiction of the supreme 
tribunal shall extend 
“The Jurisdiction of the 
Supreme Court shall extend  
to all cases arising under laws 
passed by the Legislature of the 
                                                                                                             
145.   See supra notes 126–131 and accompanying text (discussing Wilson’s speech to the Convention 
on June 16, 1787). 
146.   RECORDS II, supra note 12, at 176. 
147.   See id. 
148.   Id. at 146–47. 
149.   Id. at 186. This text of the Committee’s report comes from Madison’s notes; however, his 
numbering of the articles differs from extant copies of the original printed report. Id. at 177 n.2. Madison 
numbered this section as Article XI; the printed original numbered it as Article X. Id. at 177 n.1, 186. 
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1 to all cases, arising under laws 
passed by the general 
‹Legislature› 
2. to impeachments of officers, 
and 
3. to such other cases, as the 
national legislature may assign, 
as involving the national peace 
and harmony, 
in the collection of the revenue 
in disputes 
between citizens of different 
states 
‹in disputes between a State & a 
Citizen or Citizens of another 
State› 
in disputes between different 
states; 
and 
in disputes, in which subjects or 
citizens of other countries are 
concerned 
‹& in Cases of Admiralty 
Jurisdn› 
But this supreme jurisdiction 
shall be appellate only, except in 
‹Cases of Impeachmt. & (in)› 
those instances, in which the 
legislature shall make it original. 
and the legislature shall organize 
it.”  
United States;  
to all cases affecting 
Ambassadors, other Public 
Ministers and Consuls;  
to the trial of impeachments of 
Officers of the United States;  
to all cases of Admiralty and 
maritime jurisdiction;  
to controversies between two or 
more States, (except such as 
shall regard Territory or 
Jurisdiction) between a State and 
Citizens of another State, 
between Citizens of different 
States, and between a State or the 
Citizens thereof and foreign 
States, citizens or subjects.  In 
cases of impeachment, cases 
affecting Ambassadors, other 
Public Ministers and Consuls, 
and those in which a State shall 
be party, this jurisdiction shall be 
original. In all the other cases 
before mentioned, it shall be 
appellate, with such exceptions 
and under such regulations as the 
Legislature shall make.” 
 
On August 27 and August 28, 1787, the Convention took up 
discussion of the Committee’s proposed Article X, and ten 
44
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 5 [2020], Art. 8
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol36/iss5/8
2020] QUESTIONS INVOLVING NATIONAL PEACE AND HARMONY 579 
amendments were approved, indicated below by numbering and 
bold-face:150 
 
Art.  X, Committee’s Draft151 Art. X as amended Aug. 27, 28 
“The Jurisdiction of the Supreme 
Court” shall extend to all cases 
arising under laws passed by the 
Legislature of the United States; 
to all “cases affecting 
Ambassadors, other public 
Ministers and consuls[;] 
to the trial of impeachments of 
officers of the United States[;]  
to all cases of admiralty and 
maritime jurisdiction;  
to controversies between two or 
more States, [except such as 
shall regard Territory or 
Jurisdiction] 
between a State and Citizens of 
another State, 
between Citizens of different 
States, 
and between a State or the 
Citizens thereof and foreign 
States, citizens or subjects. 
In cases of impeachment, cases 
affecting Ambassadors, other 
public Ministers and consuls, 
“The (1) Judicial power152 shall 
extend to all cases (2) both in 
law and equity153 arising (3) 
under this constitution the154 
laws passed by (4) the 
Legislature of155 the United 
States, (5) and treaties made or 
which shall be made under 
their authority156 
to all cases affecting 
Ambassadors, other Public 
Ministers and Consuls;  
to the trial of impeachments of 
Officers of the United States;  
to all cases of Admiralty and 
maritime jurisdiction;  
to controversies between two or 
more States, (except such as 
shall regard Territory or 
Jurisdiction) 
between a State and Citizens of 
another State, 
between Citizens of different 
States,  
(6) between Citizens of the 
                                                                                                             
150.   RECORDS II, supra note 12 at 422–38. 
151.   Id. at 186–87. 
152.   Id. at 425.  
153.   Id. 
154.   Id. at 423. 
155.   Id. at 423–24 (deleting the phrase “passed by the Legislature”). 
156.   RECORDS II, supra note 12, at 423–24.  
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and those in which a State shall 
be Party, this jurisdiction shall 
be original. In all the other cases 
before mentioned, it shall be 
appellate, with such exceptions 
and under such regulations as the 
Legislature shall make. 
The Legislature may assign any 
part of the jurisdiction above 
mentioned (except the trial of the 
President of the United States) in 
the manner, and under the 
limitations which it shall think 
proper, to such Inferior Courts, 
as it shall constitute from time to 
time.” 
same State claiming lands 
under grants of different 
States157 and between a State or 
the Citizens thereof and foreign 
States, citizens or subjects. In 
cases of impeachment, cases 
affecting Ambassadors, other 
Public Ministers and Consuls, 
and those in which  
(7) the United States or158  
a State shall be a party, 
the supreme Court shall have 
original jurisdiction.  
In all the other cases before 
mentioned, the (8) supreme 
Court shall have appellate 
jurisdiction159 (9) both as to 
law and fact160  
with such exceptions and under 
such regulations as the 
Legislature shall make.  
(10) The Legislature may assign 
any part of the jurisdiction above 
mentioned (except the trial of the 
President of the United States) in 
the manner, and under the 
limitations which it shall think 
proper, to such Inferior Courts, 
as it shall constitute from time to 
time.”161 
                                                                                                             
157.   Id. at 425. 
158.   Id. at 424. 
159.   Id. at 437 (the only amendment adopted on August 28). 
160.   Id. at 424. 
161.   Id. at 425 (deleting last sentence of the Committee’s proposed Article X). 
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With these amendments, Article X of the Committee’s draft now 
closely resembled Article III, Section Two as it appears in the 
Constitution.162 
James Madison recorded in his notes that he had expressed doubt on 
August 27 about one of the amendments, what we have numbered 
above as amendment (3): 
Docr. Johnson [William Johnson, who held a Doctor of 
Laws degree] moved to insert the words ‘this Constitution 
and the’ before the word ‘laws[.]’ 
Mr Madison doubted whether it was not going too far to 
extend the jurisdiction of the Court generally to cases arising 
Under the Constitution, & whether it ought not to be limited 
to cases of a Judiciary Nature. The right of expounding the 
Constitution in cases not of this nature ought not to be given 
to that Department.163 
What might be inferred from these statements made by Madison on 
August 27? First, Madison apparently worried that “cases” could be 
interpreted as having such a broad meaning that adding the phrase 
“cases arising under the Constitution” might go “too far to extend the 
jurisdiction of the Court.” Second, Madison seemed to think that the 
phrase “cases arising under the Constitution,” unless “limited,” could 
be interpreted as extending to “cases not of a judiciary nature.” 
The working draft before Johnson’s amendment already contained 
the phrase “cases arising under laws.” Madison obviously did not think 
that phrase needed to be “limited,” so it could not be interpreted as 
extending to “cases not of a judiciary nature” because he was the 
author and proponent of “cases arising laws.”164 Why, then, did he 
                                                                                                             
162.   The only substantive differences from Article III are that “controversies to which the United 
States shall be a Party” has been added to what was approved on August 27 and 28 and jurisdiction over 
impeachments has been removed as discussed below. See infra notes 179–190 and accompanying text. 
163.   RECORDS II, supra note 12, at 430; MADISON’S NOTES, supra note 64, at 475. 
164.   See supra notes 59–81 and accompanying text (discussing Madison’s resolution, introduced July 
18, 1787). 
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apparently think that “cases” might become dangerously ambiguous if 
the text was amended as proposed by Johnson?  
This puzzle can be resolved if both “cases arising under this 
Constitution” and “cases arising under the laws” were implicitly 
understood by Madison to be functioning as shell-noun phrases.165 If 
both are shell-noun phrases, then “cases” can definitely have a very 
different meaning in each phrase. To illustrate, if “questions” is 
substituted for “cases” (as the “and such other” provision and Wilson’s 
speech suggest would be permissible), then it becomes more 
understandable that “questions arising under the constitution” could 
seem to be a very different exercise of judicial power than “questions 
arising under the laws.” Madison’s assumption that “cases arising 
under the constitution” might not be “cases of a judiciary nature” 
makes more sense if “cases” is not tied to the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of “injured plaintiff litigation,” but instead functions to 
introduce and characterize its shell content, “arising under the 
constitution.” 
In the printed version of Madison’s notes, the following sentence 
follows the paragraph discussed above: 
The motion of Docr. Johnson was agreed to nem: con: [Latin 
abbreviation for “no-one contradicting”] it being generally 
supposed that the jurisdiction given was constructively 
limited to cases of a Judiciary nature.166 
It is somewhat difficult to interpret this cryptic sentence.  Does it 
mean the motion passed because Madison was the only delegate who 
thought the phrase created by Johnson’s amendment, “all cases arising 
under this constitution,” was dangerously ambiguous? Does it mean 
the motion passed because all the other delegates—unlike Madison—
did understand the phrase to mean “cases of a Judiciary nature?” If 
these are the correct interpretations, could it be argued from this 
                                                                                                             
165.  We know Madison was very adept at using shell-noun phrases. See supra notes 82–94 and 
accompanying text. 
166.   MADISON’S NOTES, supra note 64, at 475. 
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sentence that the Court is right to assume that the “all cases arising” 
phrases in Article III only include “injured plaintiff litigation?” 
To pursue this line of argument, one would have to assume that this 
cryptic sentence reliably reports words actually spoken by other 
delegates at the Convention rather than just Madison’s private 
speculation for why Johnson’s motion passed, despite what Madison 
reports that he said in opposition. To determine the reliability of this 
cryptic sentence, it is then further necessary to examine more closely 
when and how this sentence came to be written down. 
The standard compilation of Convention records follows the format 
of the print version of Madison’s notes and presents the cryptic 
sentence in the same way as the paragraph that begins “Docr. Johnson 
moved to insert the words ‘this Constitution and the’ before the word 
‘laws.’”167 However, the National Archives Founders Online presents 
this cryptic sentence as a footnote to the paragraph, noting the sentence 
was “added” by “JM” (James Madison).168 
An image from the original manuscript of Madison’s notes in the 
Library of Congress, from which these printed passages were taken, 
appears below.169 
 
                                                                                                             
167.   RECORDS II, supra note 12, at 430. 
168.   Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court (Aug. 27, 1787), in 10 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 157, 
157–58 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds, 1977), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-10-02-
0108 [https://perma.cc/TP8J-CRQZ]. 
169.   James Madison's Notes of the Constitutional Convention (Aug. 27, 1787), in RECORDS II, supra 
note 12, at 426–32, https://www.consource.org/document/james-madisons-notes-of-the-constitutional-
convention-1787-8-27/# [https://perma.cc/635W-WA5P]. 
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In his preface to “Debates in the Convention” Madison wrote: 
I chose a seat in front of the presiding member, with the other 
members on my right & left hands. In this favorable position 
for hearing all that passed, I noted in terms legible & in 
abbreviations & marks intelligible to myself what was read 
from the Chair [presiding officer George Washington] or 
spoken by the members; and losing not a moment 
unnecessarily between the adjournment & reassembling of 
the Convention I was enabled to write out my daily notes 
during the session or within a few finishing days after its 
close . . . .170 
In his introduction to The Records of the Federal Convention of 
1787, Professor Farrand tells us: 
“It is . . . very helpful to know that it was Madison’s 
invariable practice in his original notes to refer to himself as 
                                                                                                             
170.   MADISON’S NOTES, supra note 64, at 14–15. 
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“M” or “Mr. M.” In the revision of his manuscript he filled 
out his own name . . . ”171 
This information would indicate the manuscript reproduced above 
(where “Mr. Madison” is written out in full) is not a page from 
Madison’s actual contemporaneous notes taken at the Convention; 
rather, it is something that was written down later—at the earliest, 
“during the session or within a few finishing days after its close.” 
However, Madison’s own correspondence confirms that he revised his 
notes after publication of the official Journal in 1819,172 more than 
thirty years after the Convention. 
The editors of the Documentary History of the United States, where 
Madison’s notes were first published, interpret the manuscript as 
reflecting the following revisions shown below by inserting 
strikethrough for original text and brackets to show revision: 
Mr Madison doubted whether it was not going too far to 
extend the jurisdiction of the Court to [generally to] cases 
arising Under the Constitution, & whether it ought not to be 
limited to cases of a Judiciary Nature. The right of 
expounding the Constitution to [in] cases not of this nature 
ought not to be given to them in general by to that 
Department.173 
These alterations may have been part of the revisions made after 
1819, and it is possible that the sentence about Johnson’s motion being 
“agreed to nem: con,” which appears to be squeezed onto the bottom 
of the page, was also made at the later date. 
Apart from the risk that Madison was interpreting events long after 
the fact rather than actually remembering what was said, the claim in 
his notes that it was “generally supposed that the jurisdiction given was 
constructively limited to cases of a Judiciary nature” presents other 
problems. The phrase “cases of a judiciary nature” only appears three 
                                                                                                             
171.   RECORDS I, supra note 57, at xviii n.23. 
172.   Id. at xvi. 
173.   3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1786-
1870, at 626 (1998). 
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times among the 136 million words of COFEA, and those three 
occurrences all come from Madison’s one paragraph objection to 
Johnson’s amendment on August 27: 
 
 
In fact, the phrase “judiciary nature” only appears two other times in 
COFEA, both times in documents written by James Madison, 
suggesting the phrase may have been idiosyncratic to him: 
 
 
If “judiciary nature” was a term coined and only used by Madison, then 
it seems doubtful that the other delegates would have actually uttered 
words like “we approve Johnson’s motion because we suppose that the 
jurisdiction given is constructively limited to cases of a Judiciary 
nature.” Further, as discussed below,174 there is clear evidence 
                                                                                                             
174.   See infra notes 208–212. 
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contemporaneous with ratification that Madison’s primary colleague 
in developing the language that became Article III—Governor 
Randolph—continued to think that “all cases arising under the 
Constitution” was dangerously ambiguous, providing a powerful 
counterexample to the assumption that Madison’s doubts were 
overcome by general agreement that “cases arising under the 
Constitution” was “constructively limited to cases of a Judiciary 
nature.” 
Finally, considering what weight to give this cryptic sentence brings 
to mind Justice Scalia’s definition of “original meaning”: “What was 
the most plausible meaning of the words of the Constitution to the 
society that adopted it—regardless of what the Framers might secretly 
have intended?”175 One of the first decisions made by the Convention 
was to keep all its proceedings secret,176 and Madison deliberately 
chose not to make his notes public until after his death, decades after 
ratification.177 As mentioned above, Madison himself advised that the 
intentions of those who “prepared and proposed the Constitution” 
should only be given “respect” as “presumptive evidence of the 
general understanding at the time of the language used,” because “the 
only authoritative intentions were those of the people of the States, as 
expressed thro[ugh] the Conventions which ratified the 
Constitution.”178 
If the first reaction of someone as skilled in using the language of 
Constitution writing as James Madison was to hear “cases arising 
under the constitution” as giving the Supreme Court the “right of 
expounding the Constitution” for not only “cases of a judiciary nature” 
but also “cases not of this nature,” then it is hard to exclude the 
possibility that the members of the ratifying conventions would have 
heard the phrase the same way. 
                                                                                                             
175.   SCALIA, supra note 15, at 183 (emphasis added). 
176.  Daniel Webster, The Madison Papers, in 4 THE WORKS OF DANIEL WEBSTER 301, 301–03 
(Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 9th ed. 1856) (remarks made in the Senate of the United States on February 
20, 1837, in relation to purchase of the Manuscript Papers of James Madison). 
177.   Id. 
178.   Letter from James Madison to Martin L. Hurlbut, supra note 17. 
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 4.   “Cases of Impeachment” 
On September 8, 1787, as the Convention approached its final days, 
a Committee on Style was appointed “to revise the style of and arrange 
the articles which had been agreed to by the house.”179 Both James 
Madison and Alexander Hamilton were members of this 
Committee.180 The Committee transformed the jurisdictional provision 
as amended on August 27 and 28 into Article III: 
 
Art. X as Amended Aug. 27-
28181 
Article III, Sec. 2 
The Judicial power shall 
extend to all cases both in law 
and equity arising under this 
constitution the laws passed by 
the Legislature of the United 
States, and treaties made or 
which shall be made under their 
authority 
 to all cases affecting 
Ambassadors, other Public 
Ministers and Consuls;  
to the trial of impeachments 
of Officers of the United 
States;  
to all cases of Admiralty and 
maritime jurisdiction; 
 
 
 
 to controversies between two 
or more States, (except such as 
shall regard Territory or 
The judicial power shall 
extend to all cases, in law and 
equity, arising under this 
Constitution, the laws of the 
United States, and treaties made, 
or which shall be made, under 
their authority; 
    
  —to all cases affecting 
ambassadors, other public 
ministers and consuls; 
 
 
 
—to all cases of admiralty and 
maritime jurisdiction; 
    —to controversies to which 
the United States shall be a 
party; 
    —to controversies between 
two or more states;  
 
                                                                                                             
179.   See FARRAND, supra note 16, at 179. 
180.   Id. 
181.   RECORDS II, supra note 12, at 422–37.  
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Jurisdiction) between a State and 
Citizens of another State, 
between Citizens of different 
States, 
between Citizens of the same 
State claiming lands under 
grants of different States 
and between a State or the 
Citizens thereof and foreign 
States, citizens or subjects 
In cases of impeachment, 
cases affecting Ambassadors, 
other Public Ministers and 
Consuls, and those in which the 
United States or a State shall be 
a party, the supreme Court shall 
have original jurisdiction. 
    In all the other cases before 
mentioned, the supreme Court 
shall have appellate jurisdiction 
both as to law and fact 
with such exceptions and under 
such regulations as the 
Legislature shall make.  
between a state and citizens of 
another state;  
between citizens of different 
states;  
between citizens of the same 
state claiming lands under grants 
of different states,  
and between a state, or the 
citizens thereof, and foreign 
states, citizens or subjects. 
 
In all cases affecting 
ambassadors, other public 
ministers and consuls, and those 
in which a state shall be party, 
the Supreme Court shall have 
original jurisdiction.  
In all the other cases before 
mentioned, the Supreme Court 
shall have appellate jurisdiction, 
both as to law and fact, with such 
exceptions, and under such 
regulations as the Congress shall 
make.182 
 
As indicated by bolding, the version reported out by the Committee 
on Style contained only two substantive changes to federal 
jurisdiction.  Jurisdiction was explicitly extended “to Controversies to 
which the United States shall be a Party.”183 The other change was to 
remove jurisdiction over impeachments of officers of the United States 
from the federal courts.184 
                                                                                                             
182.   U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
183.  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. Although technically a substantive change, this edit fell within the 
committee mandate to “revise style” because one of the amendments approved by the Convention on 
August 27, 1787, had added “cases to which the United States is a party” to the sentence creating the 
Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction. 
184.   U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6 (“The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments.”). 
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Article X, Section Four, of the Committee of Detail’s draft 
constitution stated:  
The trial of all criminal offenses, (except in cases of 
impeachments) shall be in the State where they shall be 
committed; and shall be by Jury.185  
Article X, Section Two had extended the jurisdiction of the 
“supreme tribunal” to “impeachments of officers.” However, even 
though the Committee on Style deleted this language and gave the 
Senate the sole power to try impeachments, the Committee on Style 
still retained all of this language from draft Article X, Section Four, in 
reporting back to the Convention what is now Section Three of Article 
III: 
The trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, 
shall be by jury; and such trial shall be held in the state where 
the said crimes shall have been committed; but when not 
committed within any state, the trial shall be at such place or 
places as the Congress may by law have directed.186 
How could “cases” in Article III have a stable, inherent meaning 
when it includes the use of “cases” in the phrase “cases of 
impeachment”? Not only is impeachment not “injured party 
litigation,” it is also not—in the words of James Madison—a “case of 
a judiciary nature.” The Constitution confers on the Senate “the sole 
Power to try all Impeachments.”187 
Did the Committee on Style—staffed with such skillful and careful 
writers as James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, Dr. William 
Johnson,188 and Gouverneur Morris189—just forget to delete “cases of 
                                                                                                             
185.   RECORDS II, supra note 12, at 187 (emphasis added). 
186.   Id. at 601 (emphasis added). 
187.   U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6. 
188.   See FARRAND, supra note 16, at 33. Johnson was regarded as “one of the most learned men in 
[America].” Id. 
189.  Id. at 21. Morris was “probably the most brilliant member . . . of the convention . . . with a 
wonderful command of language.” Id. 
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impeachment” from the language of Section Three when the power to 
try impeachments was transferred from the judiciary to the Senate? 
Did the entire Convention also overlook such a mistake when 
approving the final language of the Constitution? 
Interpreting case as being used as a shell noun in Article III would 
resolve such a puzzle. “Cases” appears eight times in Article III if 
“cases” is assumed to be the implicit subject of the instances numbered 
below as (2) and (3): 
The judicial power shall extend 
[1] to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this 
Constitution, 
[2] [to all cases, in law and equity, arising under] the 
Laws of the United States . . . 
[3] And [to all cases, in law and equity, arising under] 
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their 
Authority; 
[4] —to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public 
Ministers and Consuls; 
[5] —to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction; 
—to Controversies to which the United States shall be a 
Party; 
—to Controversies between two or more States; 
—between a State and Citizens of another State; 
—between Citizens of different States; 
—between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under 
Grants of different States, and between a State, or the 
Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects. 
[6] In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public 
Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall 
be Party, the [S]upreme Court shall have original 
Jurisdiction. 
[7] In all the other Cases before mentioned, the [S]upreme 
Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and 
Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as 
the Congress shall make. 
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The Trial of all Crimes, [8] except in Cases of 
Impeachment, shall be by Jury; and such Trial shall be held 
in the State where the said Crimes shall have been 
committed; but when not committed within any State, the 
Trial shall be at such Place or Places as the Congress may by 
Law have directed.190 
“Cases” could be understood as starting off with a vague, abstract 
meaning each time it appears in Article III, a meaning that is only 
completed by the information that follows it (indicated above for each 
of the eight uses by bolding). Under this shell-noun interpretation, it 
would have been perfectly appropriate for the Committee on Style to 
continue to use the phrase “cases of impeachment,” even after control 
of the impeachment process was moved from the judiciary to the 
Senate because “cases” in this last usage in Article III did not have to 
have a meaning at all similar to “cases” when used earlier in the 
context of creating federal court jurisdiction. 
5.  Cases in Law and Equity 
Even if “cases” in Article III by itself did not have a stable, inherent 
meaning approximating the Supreme Court’s interpretation (“injured 
plaintiff litigation”), is it possible that the meaning of the complete 
shell-noun phrase, “all cases, in law and equity, arising under this 
Constitution” does mean only “injured plaintiff litigation” because in 
the final version of Article III, the words “in law and equity” appear 
after “cases”? 
The phrase “cases in law and equity” only appears thirty-nine times 
in COFEA, and thirty-eight of these occurrences are direct quotes or 
paraphrases of Article III.191 The thirty-ninth occurrence is a court 
decision citing a book entitled Modern Cases in Law and Equity. 
                                                                                                             
190.   U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
191.   COFEA, supra note 23. A COFEA search for “cases” appearing within six words either side of 
“law and equity” results in fifty-six occurrences, but when results lacking a grammatical relationship 
between the terms are removed, what remains again are only quotes or paraphrases of Article III. 
Searching by changing the word order to “equity and law” produces no collocation within six words of 
“cases.” 
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The phrase “law and equity” however, appears 397 times in 
COFEA, while “law or equity” appears 412 times. The distinction 
between “law” and “equity” was salient and well-known in the 
Founding Era, especially to lawyers, as referring to two different types 
of courts in the English legal system: “courts of common law” and 
“courts of equity.” The leading legal treatise of the period, 
Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England, devotes 
hundreds of pages to describing the different functions and powers of 
the two types of courts.192 
As briefly explained in the Wex Legal Dictionary: 
 
[T]he term “equity” refers to a particular set of remedies and 
associated procedures . . . . These equitable doctrines and 
procedures are distinguished from “legal” ones. While legal 
remedies typically involve monetary damages, equitable 
relief typically refers to injunctions . . . .  A court will 
typically award equitable remedies when a legal remedy is 
insufficient or inadequate. . . . The distinction arose in 
England where there were separate courts of law and courts 
of equity.193 
 
The phrase “law and equity” appears to have first entered the Article 
III drafting process on August 27, 1787. According to Madison’s 
notes, as soon as the Convention “took up” consideration of the 
Committee of Detail’s draft Article X, Doctor William Johnson 
“moved and seconded to insert the words ‘both in law and equity’ after 
the words ‘U.S.’ in the 1st line of sect. 1.” This appears to have been 
the first of the many amendments to draft Article X made that day,194 
and its effect would have been as follows: 
                                                                                                             
192.   See generally 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES. 
193.  Equity, Wex Legal Dictionary, CORNELL L. SCH. LEGAL INFO. INST., 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/equity [https://perma.cc/S9HY-A8RR] (last visited Nov. 7, 2019).  
194.   See RECORDS II, supra note 12, at 428 (quoting the official Journal and Madison’s notes). 
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The Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court shall extend to all 
cases arising under laws passed by the Legislature of the 
United States both in law and equity. 
Madison’s notes indicate when Johnson made his motion at the 
outset of the discussion of federal jurisdiction, he “suggested that the 
judicial power ought to extend to equity as well as law.”195 Madison 
reports that Mr. George Read of Delaware then “objected to vesting 
these powers in the same Court.”196 Thus, it appears that “both in law 
and equity” were understood to modify “jurisdiction of the Supreme 
Court” rather than “cases.” 
Unlike most of the amendments on federal jurisdiction, which 
passed unanimously, adding “both in law and equity” was only 
supported by six state delegations—barely a majority at that point in 
the Convention.197 Two states voted no, and three states are recorded 
as absent or abstaining.198 It appears this amendment was controversial 
because the delegates understood adding “both in law and equity” as 
expanding federal judicial power rather than narrowing it. As 
described below, this understanding was consistent with discussion of 
this provision at the Virginia Ratifying Convention.199 
The official Journal notes that, after delegates accepted most other 
amendments that day, another motion was approved to add “both law 
and equity” before the word “arising”: 
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, both in law 
and equity arising under this Constitution the Laws [passed 
by the Legislature] of the United States,  
and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their 
                                                                                                             
195.   Id. at 428 (emphasis added). 
196.   Id. 
197.   Id. 
198.   Id. 
199.   See 3 The Debates in the Convention of the Commonwealth of Virginia on the Adoption of the 
Federal Constitution, in THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE 
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 1, 565 (Jonathan Elliot ed., Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott Co. 2d ed. 1836) 
[hereinafter THE DEBATES] (emphasis added). 
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Authority;—to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other 
public Ministers and Consuls200 
The Committee on Style removed the word “both” and set off “in 
law and equity” with commas, giving us the version that appears in the 
Constitution: 
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and 
Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the 
United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, 
under their Authority;—to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, 
other public Ministers and Consuls;—to all Cases of 
admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction . . . .201 
Would the members of the state ratifying conventions have 
considered “to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this 
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made” as 
extending judicial power more narrowly than if the phrase “in Law and 
Equity” was not part of the text? 
If inclusion of the phrase “in Law and Equity” was understood as 
giving federal courts all the powers that existing courts possessed, that 
understanding would have been inconsistent with a limited “injured 
plaintiff litigation” meaning for “Cases[] in Law and Equity.” Robert 
Pushaw has assembled considerable historical evidence that, during 
the Founding Era, access to courts in both England and the American 
states was not predicated on showing particularized injury. 
In public law cases, a controversy was not required. A citizen 
who had suffered no individualized injury could challenge 
unlawful government action in a variety of 
ways . . . . “[R]elator” actions authorized citizens with no 
                                                                                                             
200.   RECORDS II, supra note 12, at 425. 
201.   U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
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personal stake in a matter of public interest to prosecute as 
private attorneys general.202 
To a twenty-first century lawyer or judge, inserting “in law and 
equity” into the phrase “all cases arising” makes it difficult to 
interchange “questions” for “cases”: “questions in law and equity 
arising under the Constitution . . . laws . . . treaties” may not sound 
well-formed. However, Professor Pushaw tells us that “‘by 1770 the 
power of English judges to give advisory opinions was well 
recognized[,]’ [and] American courts [also] rendered advisory 
opinions . . . .”203 The Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 specifically 
required its supreme judicial court to answer questions from both the 
legislature and governor: 
Each branch of the legislature, as well as the governor and 
council, shall have authority to require the opinions of the 
justices of the supreme judicial court upon important 
questions of law, and upon solemn occasions.204 
As discussed in greater detail below, in apparent reliance on Article 
III’s extension of judicial power to “all Cases[] in Law and 
Equity . . . arising under Treaties,” at the direction of President George 
Washington, Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson submitted to the 
U.S. Supreme Court twenty-nine very specific but hypothetical 
questions about the interpretation of treaties between the United States 
and France.205 Secretary Jefferson gave President Washington a 
                                                                                                             
202.   Pushaw, supra note 43, at 480–81. 
203.   Id. at 481. 
204.  MASS. CONST. OF 1780, pt. II, ch. 3, art. II; see Pushaw, supra note 43, at 481 n.177 (quoting 
PAUL M. BATOR ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 70 
(3d ed. 1988)) (citing similar provisions in New Hampshire’s constitution). 
205.  Enclosure Questions for the Supreme Court (July 18, 1793), in 13 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE 
WASHINGTON 243, 243–47 (Christine Sternberg Patrick ed., 2007), 
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/05-13-02-0164-0002 [https://perma.cc/8M78-
AX8R]; Letter from Thomas Jefferson to George Washington (July 19, 1973), in 13 THE PAPERS OF 
GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra, at 251, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/05-13-02-
0168 [https://perma.cc/M84K-32RA]. 
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subsequent status report, saying two of the justices “had called on him” 
to ask whether the letter transmitting the questions “pressed for an 
answer.”206 Jefferson said in his report that he told the justices “the 
cases would await their time.”207 
C.  Virginia Governor Edmund Randolph’s Opposition to 
Ratification 
Madison was not the only important convention delegate who 
thought “all cases arising under the constitution” was dangerously 
ambiguous.208 Despite having proposed the Virginia Plan and having 
served on the critical Committee of Detail that turned the Convention’s 
resolutions into the Constitution’s final format, Virginia Governor 
Edmund Randolph famously refused to sign the Constitution.209 
In a letter to the Speaker of the Virginia House of Delegates dated 
October 10, 1787, Randolph explained his position that the 
Constitution should not be ratified until, among other conditions, “all 
ambiguities of expression . . . be precisely explained” including 
“limiting and defining the judicial power.”210 
In a subsequent speech at the Virginia Ratifying Convention, which 
Randolph chaired, he made clear that his concerns about ambiguity 
mirrored what Madison said at the Convention about adding “arising 
under the Constitution”: 
[T]here are defects in its construction, among which may be 
objected too great an extension of jurisdiction. . . . It is 
ambiguous in some parts, and unnecessarily extensive in 
others. It extends to all cases in law and equity arising under 
the Constitution. What are these cases of law and equity? Do 
they not involve all rights, from an inchoate right to a 
complete right, arising from this Constitution? 
Notwithstanding the contempt gentlemen express for 
                                                                                                             
206.   Letter from Thomas Jefferson to George Washington, supra note 205. 
207.   Id.  
208.   See RECORDS III, supra note 65, at 123–28. 
209.   Id. at 123. 
210.   Id. at 127 (emphasis added). 
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technical terms, I wish such were mentioned here. I would 
have thought it more safe, if it had been more clearly 
expressed. What do we mean by the words arising under 
the Constitution? What do they relate to? I conceive this to 
be very ambiguous.211 
In this statement, Randolph, who later became the country’s first 
Attorney General, interpreted “all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising 
under the Constitution” as extending the federal judicial power to 
“inchoate right[s].”212 It is difficult to find an interpretation more at 
odds with the Supreme Court’s interpretation of “cases” as meaning 
“injured plaintiff litigation.” 
D.  Questions for the Supreme Court on Treaties Between the 
U.S. and France213 
One of the most challenging dilemmas of President Washington’s 
second term was maintaining neutrality in the war between Great 
Britain and the revolutionary government of France.214 
On July 11, 1793, Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson transmitted 
to President Washington detailed written notes of a contentious 
conversation with the French diplomat Edmond Genet. His notes 
included the following statements: 
[H]e charged us with having violated the treaties between the 
two nations, & so went into the cases which had before been 
                                                                                                             
211.  THE DEBATES, supra note 199, at 571–72 (emphasis added). See the statement of William 
Grayson, immediately preceding Randolph’s speech to the Virginia Ratifying Convention: 
My next objection to the federal judiciary is, that it is not expressed in a definite 
manner. The jurisdiction of all cases arising under the Constitution and the laws of the 
Union is of stupendous magnitude. 
It is impossible for human nature to trace its extent. It is so vaguely and indefinitely 
expressed, that its latitude cannot be ascertained. 
Id. at 565. 
212.   Id. at 572. 
213.   For an excellent background account of this dispute, see Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Why the Supreme 
Court Nevers Gets Any “Dear John” Letters: Advisory Opinions in Historical Perspective, 87 GEO. L.J. 
473 (1998). 
214.   Id. at 488–90. 
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subjects of discussion . . . says he, at least, Congress are 
bound to see that the treaties are observed. I told him No, 
there were very few cases indeed arising out of treaties 
which they could take notice of; that the President is to see 
that treaties are observed. and if he decides against the treaty 
to whom is a nation to appeal? I told him the constitution had 
made the President the last appeal. . . . I told him . . . we 
would have enquiries made into the facts, & would thank 
him for information on the subject, & that I would take care 
that the case should be laid before the President the day after 
his return.215 
Jefferson repeatedly uses case in reference to the dispute over the 
treaties, and while apparently recognizing that there might be (very) 
“few cases indeed arising out of treaties” that could be “notice[d]” by 
Congress, this case was to be “laid before” the President for his 
decision.216 
The very next day, on July 12, 1792, a “Cabinet Opinion on Foreign 
Vessels and Consulting the Supreme Court” was issued over the names 
of Thomas Jefferson, Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton, and 
Secretary of War Henry Knox.217 The Opinion stated in part: 
At a meeting of the heads of the departments at the 
President’s on summons from him, and on consideration of 
various representations from the Ministers Plenipotentiary 
of France & Great Britain on the subject of vessels arming 
& arriving in our ports, and of prizes it is their opinion that 
letters be written to the said Ministers informing them that 
                                                                                                             
215.   Enclosure: Thomas Jefferson’s Notes on a Conversation with Edmond Genet (July 10, 1973), in 
13 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 205, at 202,  203–04 (emphasis added), 
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/05-13-02-0137-0002 [https://perma.cc/S3DS-
4GU5]. 
216.   Id. 
217. Washington’s cabinet had only four members. Cabinet Members, MOUNT VERNON, 
https://www.mountvernon.org/library/digitalhistory/digital-encyclopedia/article/cabinet-members/ 
[https://perma.cc/EKN6-2PRP] (last visited Nov. 7, 2019). The member whose name did not appear on 
this Opinion was Attorney General Edmund Randolph. Id. 
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the Executive of the U.S., desirous of having done what shall 
be strictly comformeable to the treaties of the U.S. and the 
laws respecting the said cases has determined to refer the 
questions arising therein to persons learned in the laws . . . .  
That letters be addressed to the Judges of the Supreme 
court of the U.S. requesting their attendance at this place on 
Thursday the 18th instant to give their advice on certain 
matters of public concern which will be referred to them by 
the President.218 
Apparently what Jefferson described in his July 11th memo to 
Washington as “the case to be laid before the President” has now 
become “the cases” to be referred to the Supreme Court. 
On July 18, 1793, Jefferson sent a letter to the Supreme Court 
Justices enclosing twenty-nine specific questions that could be said to 
be “arising under the . . . Treaties” between the United States and 
France.219 In several questions (numbered below as they are in 
Jefferson’s letter), he uses case: 
3. Do [the treaties] give to France, or her citizens, in the case 
supposed, a right to refit, or arm anew vessels, which 
before their coming within any port of the U.S. were 
armed for war, with or without commission? 
  
5. Does the 22d article of the Treaty of commerce, in the 
case supposed, extend to vessels armed for war on 
account of the government of a power at war with France, 
or to merchant armed vessels belonging to the subjects or 
citizens of that power (viz.) of the description of those 
which, by the English, are called Letters of marque ships, 
                                                                                                             
218.   Cabinet Opinion on Foreign Vessels and Consulting the Supreme Court (July 12, 1793), in 13 
THE PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 205, at 214, 214–15 (emphasis added), 
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/05-13-02-0143 [https://perma.cc/7MQY-6ZWS]. 
219.   Enclosure Questions for the Supreme Court, supra note 205. The complete set of 29 questions is 
posted in the online appendix. 
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by the French ‘batiments armés en marchandize et en 
guerre’? 
 
6. Do the treaties aforesaid prohibit the U.S. from permitting 
in the case supposed, the armed vessels belonging to a 
power at war with France, or to the citizens or subjects of 
such power to come within the ports of the U.S. there to 
remain as long as they may think fit, except in the case of 
their coming in with prizes made of the subjects or 
property of France? 
 
7. Do they prohibit the U.S. from permitting in the case 
supposed vessels armed on account of the government of 
a power at war with France, or vessels armed for 
merchandize & war, with or without commission on 
account of the subjects or citizens of such power, or any 
vessels other than those commonly called privateers, to 
sell freely whatsoever they may bring into the ports of the 
U.S. & freely to purchase in & carry from the ports of the 
U.S. goods, merchandize & commodities, except as 
excepted in the last question? 
 
8. Do they oblige the U.S. to permit France, in the case 
supposed, to sell in their ports the prizes which she or her 
citizens may have made of any power at war with her, the 
citizens or subjects of such power; or exempt from the 
payment of the usual duties, on ships & merchandize, the 
prizes so made, in the case of their being to be sold 
within the ports of the U.S.? 
 . . . .  
11. Do the laws of Neutrality, considered relatively to the 
treaties of the U.S. with foreign powers, or independantly 
of those treaties permit the U.S. in the case supposed, to 
allow to France, or her citizens the privilege of fitting out 
originally, in & from the ports of the U.S. vessels armed 
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& commissioned for war, either on account of the 
government, or of private persons, or both?220 
He uses case each time as a shell noun. The recurrent phrase “in the 
case supposed” is incomprehensible without its shell content, which is 
the entire first question Jefferson poses: 
1. Do the treaties between the U.S. & France give to France 
or her citizens a right, when at war with a power with 
whom the U.S. are at peace, to fit out originally in & from 
the ports of the U.S., vessels armed for war, with or 
without commission?221 
The other two uses of case nicely illustrate the shell-noun pattern 
“noun + of” discussed above.222 In both instances case takes on 
meaning only when combined with its shell content, marked by 
bolding: 
6. [E]xcept in the case of their coming in with prizes made 
of the subjects or property of France? 
   
8. Do they oblige the U.S. to . . . exempt from the payment 
of the usual duties, on ships & merchandize the prizes so 
made, in the case of their being to be sold within the 
ports of the U.S?223 
On July 19, 1793, Jefferson provided the following status report to 
Washington: 
Th: Jefferson with his respects to the President has the honor 
to inform him that Judges Jay and Wilson called on him just 
                                                                                                             
220.   Id. (emphasis added). 
221.   Id. 
222.   See supra notes 99–105. 
223.   Id. (emphasis added). 
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now and asked whether the letter of yesterday pressed for an 
answer. They were told the cases would await their time, and 
were asked when they thought an answer might be expected: 
they said they supposed in a day or two.224 
The interchangeability of “questions” with “cases” seen in the 
drafting history seems to reappear here. Jefferson sent the Supreme 
Court “questions arising under [the] treaties” but describes what the 
Justices received as “cases.” 
The submission of the twenty-nine questions to the Supreme Court 
did not result in a published decision; instead, the following short letter 
was sent to President Washington signed by five Justices. 225 
Philadelphia 8 Augt 1793 
Sir 
We have considered the previous Question stated in a 
Letter written to us by your Direction, by the Secretary of 
State, on the 18th of last month. 
The Lines of Separation drawn by the Constitution 
between the three Departments of Government—their being 
in certain Respects checks on each other—and our being 
Judges of a court in the last Resort—are Considerations 
which afford strong arguments against the Propriety of our 
extrajudicially deciding the questions alluded to; especially 
as the Power given by the Constitution to the President of 
calling on the Heads of Departments for opinions, seems to 
have been purposely as well as expressly limited to executive 
Departments. 
we exceedingly regret every Event that may cause 
Embarrassment to your administration; but we derive 
Consolation from the Reflection, that your Judgment will 
                                                                                                             
224.   Letter from Thomas Jefferson to George Washington, supra note 205 (emphasis added). 
225.   The sixth Justice, William Cushing, was not in attendance at the Court at the time. Letter from 
Supreme Court Justices to George Washington (Aug. 8, 1793), in 13 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE 
WASHINGTON, supra note 205, at 392, 392–93, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/05-
13-02-0263 [https://perma.cc/2MCM-RYER]. 
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discern what is Right, and that your usual Prudence, 
Decision and Firmness will surmount every obstacle to the 
Preservation of the Rights, Peace, and Dignity of the united 
States. We have the Honor to be, with perfect Respect, Sir, 
your most obedient and most h’ble servants[.]226 
The Supreme Court has often expressed its interpretation of the 
meaning of “cases” in Article III in terms of a prohibition on issuing 
“mere” advisory opinions. For example, in United Public Workers of 
America v. Mitchell, the Court said: 
As is well known the federal courts established pursuant to 
Article III of the Constitution do not render advisory 
opinions.  [FN 19] For adjudication of constitutional issues 
“concrete legal issues, presented in actual cases, not 
abstractions” are requisite.227 
Footnote nineteen cites the August 8, 1793 letter from the Justices to 
President Washington.228 
    Indeed the Justices’ letter to Washington is almost an automatic 
citation when the Court claims that Article III does not give federal 
courts the power to issue advisory opinions, as illustrated by this quote 
from Flast v. Cohen: “The rule against advisory opinions was 
established as early as 1793.”229 
However, despite the prevalent use of this 1793 letter to buttress a 
narrow interpretation of “cases” in Article III, the Justices say nothing 
in the 1793 letter about declining to answer the twenty-nine questions 
because they do not present a “case.” Instead the Justices refer 
generally to the principle of separation of powers, to the “impropriety” 
of deciding questions presented in an “extrajudicial” way, and to 
Article II, Section Two as expressly setting forth a method for the 
President to “require” opinions from principal officers of his executive 
                                                                                                             
226.   Id. 
227.   United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 80 (1947) (emphasis added). 
228.   Id. at 89 n.19. 
229.   Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 96 n.14 (1968). 
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departments. 
     In contrast to the Justices’ silence, it seems apparent that George 
Washington, who presided at the Constitutional Convention, and his 
cabinet—which included Alexander Hamilton, who served on the 
committee that finalized the Constitution—chose to handle the treaty 
dispute with France as if the federal judicial power under Article III 
did extend to deciding questions “arising under . . . [t]reaties.” 
CONCLUSION 
One of the most glaring flaws of the Articles of Confederation was 
that the Articles supported only a very weak federal judiciary 
system.230 When delegates gathered in Philadelphia to draft a new 
constitution, they started out with high aspirations for establishing 
courts empowered to “hear and determine . . . questions which may 
involve the national peace and harmony.”231 The linguistic and 
historical analyses presented in this article support a conclusion that 
this aspiration did not disappear when “questions involving national 
peace and harmony” evolved into a series of shell-noun phrases 
introduced by the word “cases” instead of “questions.”  
We hope that this empirical research, presented with a transparency 
that allows all readers to “check our work” for themselves, will prompt 
reevaluation of the Supreme Court’s assumption that the original 
meaning of “cases” in Article III had the restrictive meaning of 
“injured plaintiff litigation”—an interpretation that is inconsistent with 
evidence of how those who drafted and ratified the Constitution 
actually used language. 
                                                                                                             
230.   THE DEBATES, supra note 199, at 565. 
231.   RECORDS I, supra note 57, at 21–22. 
71
Ren et al.: "Questions Involving National Peace and Harmony" or "Injured Plai
Published by Reading Room, 2020
